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ABSTRACT
In the current digital era, we can do increasingly astonishing activities remotely
using only our electronic devices. In all these activities, cryptographic protocols
are required to ensure privacy for the users. In reality, some parties participating
in a protocol may be dishonest, and not act according to what was agreed in the
protocol specification. Hence, for a real world protocol to be secure, we also
need each party to prove that it behaves correctly, in accordance to the protocol.
However, it is often difficult for a party to do so without sacrificing privacy of its
inputs. One way to achieve this is by constructing a zero-knowledge argument: a
proof that gives nothing else away besides the correctness of the statement, and is
sound against polynomial-time provers who are dishonest.
In many cases, we want a zero-knowledge argument to be non-interactive and
transferable, so that it needs to be computed only once, but can be verified by
many verifiers at any future time. An interactive zero-knowledge argument can
be made non-interactive (say) using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, where a verifier’s
messages to the prover are replaced by a uniformly random output from the same
message domain, resulting in a secure protocol in the random oracle (RO) model.
Another way to achieve non-interactivity is by using the common reference string
(CRS) model, where a trusted third party outputs a common string that removes
the need for an honest verifier’s response but still guarantees security. Due to
some limitations of the RO model, we prefer working in the CRS model.
In this thesis we provide three scenarios where non-interactive zero-knowledge
(NIZK) arguments in the CRS model can be made more efficient, and are com-
parable in efficiency to the best known NIZK argument in the RO model. First,
we explain the need for verifiable computation. In this scenario we get more ef-
ficient CRS-model NIZK arguments for NP-complete languages that are simpler
to check than CIRCUIT-SAT. Next, we discuss the challenge of authorization in
real world situations. In this scenario we get NIZK arguments for set operations
that are as efficient than existing ones in the RO model but for a bigger library
of set operations. Finally, we discuss the need to shuffle ciphertexts in electronic
voting. In this scenario we get two efficient CRS-model NIZK shuffle arguments
that are almost as efficient as existing ones in the RO model.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Need to Verify Procedures
In the current digital era, we can do increasingly astonishing activities remotely
using only our electronic devices. Using mobile applications such as WhatsApp,
we can message or call someone with the guarantee, using an end-to-end encryp-
tion protocol, that only the recipient can know the contents of the message or
conversation. Most banking systems enable us to pay our bills and perform other
financial transactions, and use the TLS protocol to guarantee that no one can read
or modify the transaction data. Some countries provide an option to vote electron-
ically in an election (e.g. Estonia) or referendum (e.g. Switzerland) with similar
privacy guarantees to traditional paper voting. In all these activities, a protocol
is required to ensure privacy for the users. These protocols rely heavily in cryp-
tography, the science of secure communication between two or more parties, and
hence are categorized as cryptographic protocols.
Cryptographic protocols are much more than just ensuring privacy. This is
because in reality, we cannot just assume that all parties participating in a proto-
col will act according to what was agreed in the protocol specification. Hence,
for a real world protocol to be secure, we also need each party to prove that all
procedures it performs are in accordance to the protocol. As we want the protocol
to be practical, it must not take too long to construct such a proof. Moreover, in
many cases, the verifier does not have the computing power of a prover. For in-
stance, in the scenario of verifiable computation [48], where a verifier outsources
some computation-intensive operation to a super-computer, the verifier can be
lightweight (e.g. a mobile device). In such cases, other parties must be able to
quickly verify these procedures are indeed performed as intended.
However, it is often difficult for a party to prove that it acts correctly without
sacrificing privacy of its inputs. For example, consider the case of electronic
voting. A voter must prove that he votes for a valid candidate from the set of
10
candidates, but it is difficult to do so without giving away information on who he
voted for. If the electronic voting protocol involves mix networks (i.e. networks
that remove the relationship between senders and their messages [79]) to mix
the encrypted votes before the decryption process, then these mix networks must
prove that they perform the mixing correctly, but it is difficult to do so without
revealing something about the permutation used while mixing. Hence, what we
really want is a proof that gives nothing else away besides the correctness of the
statement. In cryptography, this is known as a zero-knowledge proof [54]. In
its simplest form, we can assume only two roles: a prover who creates a zero-
knowledge proof, and verifiers who either accept or reject the proof.
In many cases, it is not ideal for a zero-knowledge proof to be interactive.
Consider the case of an independent audit of an election based on electronic vot-
ing, performed some time after the election. The voters and voting servers in-
volved in the process must get back online to recreate proofs and possibly redo
many costly operations. In an interactive proof, a prover will have to compute
proofs for each verifier, and must be online during the whole process. In contrast,
a non-interactive proof [32] can be checked at any future time, without requiring
the prover to be online. Moreover, if the non-interactive proof is transferable (i.e.,
a verifier can directly transfer an accepting proof to another verifier), the prover
can compute a proof just once, and this proof can be checked by many verifiers.
As we will see in subsequent chapters, transferable proofs are essential in many
common scenarios. Non-interactive proofs that are non-transferable (i.e., an ac-
cepting proof cannot be transferred to another verifier) are also useful in some
scenarios such as identification [21, 13], but these scenarios are not addressed in
this thesis.
1.2 Scope and Claim of This Thesis
In cryptography we are familiar with two security models, passive and active. In
the passive security model, all parties participating in the protocol are assumed to
follow the protocol honestly, and the only mischief they can do is to be curious
about what other parties’ private inputs can be. In the active security model, we
have no guarantees that participating parties act according to the protocol. In this
case, each party must provide a guarantee of correct execution.
As we discussed above, we will focus on the active security model for two-
party protocols, where correct execution is guaranteed by a zero-knowledge proof.
Moreover, one party is designated as a prover who must prove some statement,
while the other party is designated as a verifier who can check this proof. We
focus on non-interactive proofs, consisting of a single message from the prover to
the verifier.
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There are two models mainly used to get non-interactive zero-knowledge
(NIZK) proofs: the random oracle (RO) model, and the common reference string
(CRS) model.
• In the RO model [50], we assume the existence of one or more random or-
acles that give uniformly random responses. Using the Fiat-Shamir heuris-
tic [45] or recent transforms by Lindell [66] and Ciampi et al. [29], these
random responses can be used to replace every message a verifier sends
to the prover. Although protocols in the RO model are very efficient, they
have some limitations. Due to the required properties, there is no finite al-
gorithm that can fully implement a random oracle. Moreover, there exist
cases where a protocol is secure in the RO model, but insecure if the RO is
replaced by any hash function [25, 52, 7, 12, 19].
• In the CRS model, we assume the existence of a trusted third party that out-
puts a common string that incorporates an honest verifier’s response in an
interactive protocol. After producing this string, the trusted third party will
not be needed anymore. A prover can reference this string while creating a
proof, and a verifier can use it during verification. The main disadvantage
of the CRS model is that it requires trust that the third party computes the
CRS correctly. However, in contrast to the RO model, this eliminates the
need for a heuristic and how to securely instantiate the RO. Hence security
proofs in the CRS model are more convincing than the Fiat-Shamir heuristic
used in the RO model.
We note that the Lindell [66] and Ciampi et al. [29] transforms have improved
heuristic security compared to the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, but they use both RO and
CRS. Additionally, there are two models which can be seen as relaxations of the
CRS model: the registered public key (RPK) model [4], and the bare public key
(BPK) model [24]. However, in both cases, the non-interactive proof is only valid
and checkable by a single verifier, and hence not transferable. While this in itself
is not a bad thing, it is outside our scope of transferable NIZK arguments.
In this thesis, we will focus solely on NIZK protocols in the CRS model.
This is because we are interested in cases where the proofs need to be computed
just once, and hence need to be non-interactive and transferable. Moreover, we
want to provide an alternative to existing NIZK protocols in the RO model. We
make a further restriction that we assume even a malicious prover runs in poly-
nomial time, in which case we get NIZK proofs that are computationally sound,
instead of perfectly sound. This is because it is widely believed that perfectly
sound proofs have some efficiency limitations. For example, Killian [64] proved
that while computationally sound zero-knowledge proofs can be succinct, it is
unlikely to be the case for perfectly sound zero-knowledge proofs. Computation-
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ally sound proofs are commonly called arguments, and similarly computationally
sound NIZK proofs are commonly called NIZK arguments.
The main result of this thesis is that in many practical scenarios, secure NIZK
arguments in the CRS model can be made as efficient as those in the RO model. To
support this claim, we will provide three interesting scenarios where we construct
NIZK arguments in the CRS model with efficiency comparable to the best known
NIZK argument in the RO model. In the first scenario, a lightweight verifier
outsources computation to a much more powerful prover, and needs to verify that
the computation was indeed done correctly. In the second scenario, a lightweight
verifier tries to check if a prover’s private data satisfies some properties, which
can be written as a set relation. In the third scenario, a prover tries to ensure the
privacy of voters in electronic voting by shuffling the input ciphertexts before it
goes to the decryption process, and must prove it does so correctly to a verifier
with as much computational power as the prover. The resulting NIZK arguments
in the third scenario are not yet as efficient as those in the RO model, but are still
more efficient than existing ones in the CRS model.
In all these scenarios, the prover must provide a proof to the verifier without
revealing anything about its private data (e.g., side information related to a com-
putation, sets that contain private information, or permutation used to perform a
shuffle) by using one or more NIZK arguments. This is done by first commit-
ting [28] to a set of values, then proving that the committed values satisfy some
equations that cannot hold for a dishonest prover. These scenarios and the result-
ing NIZK arguments will be discussed in more detail in chapters 3-5.
1.3 Thesis Outline and Author’s Contributions
In the following, we outline the contents of each chapter in the thesis, and describe
the author’s main contributions towards the co-authored papers.
Chapter 2 provides a quick overview of the basic concepts that are used in
cryptographic protocols. In particular, in this chapter we will introduce the
polynomial commitment scheme, which we use throughout this thesis to commit
to a vector of integers, and its security properties. We also mention the various
assumptions used in the subsequent chapters.
Chapter 3 introduces the need for verifiable computation, and why it is relevant
to cryptographic protocols. In this case, a verifier outsources computation (e.g.,
solving a NP-complete problem) to a prover who has much more computing
power than the verifier. Hence an important requirement is to have very little
communication and verifier’s computation.
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The chapter refers to the following paper included in this thesis.
• Fauzi, P., Lipmaa, H., Zhang, B.: Efficient Modular NIZK Arguments from
Shift and Product. In: Abdalla, M., Nita-Rotaru, C., Dahab, R. (eds.) CANS
2013. LNCS, vol. 8257, pp. 92–121. Springer International Publishing,
Paraty, Brazil (Nov 20–22, 2013).
This paper explains two basic NIZK arguments in the CRS model, i.e. prod-
uct and shift, and how these can be used to build a NIZK argument for
any language in NP, including an efficient range argument. The main im-
provement from previous papers is the use of best results in progression-
free sets to improve existing product arguments, and the use of a shift ar-
gument instead of the more costly permutation argument used in previous
work [67, 26] to get a NIZK argument for various NP-complete languages.
The author’s main contribution is in constructing NIZK arguments for sim-
ple NP-complete languages along with their security proof.
Chapter 4 takes a closer look at the challenge of authorization in real world situ-
ations. We note that many such situations involve proving some set relation, such
as set membership and set intersection. Moreover, to ensure privacy we need to
hide one or more of the sets in the set relation.
The chapter refers to the following paper included in this thesis.
• Fauzi, P., Lipmaa, H., Zhang, B.: Efficient Non-Interactive Zero Knowl-
edge Arguments for Set Operations. In: Christin, N., Safavi-Naini, R. (eds.)
FC 2014. LNCS, vol. 8437, pp. 216–233. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
Bridgetown, Barbados (March 3–7, 2014).
This paper proposes a new NIZK argument to prove a simple relation, PM-
SET, between four committed multisets, and how these can be used to con-
struct set membership and range arguments, as well as other set relations.
The main novelty of this paper is the construction of the PMSET argument
that is as efficient as existing NIZK arguments for set relations in the RO
model. Moreover, the flexibility of PMSET enables us to construct many
more set relations than previous work, using a constant number of PM-
SET arguments. The author’s contributions include a detailed comparison
between our arguments with related ones, constructing secure NIZK argu-
ments for various set operations from PMSET, and parts of the final security
proof.
Chapter 5 introduces the concept of shuffling ciphertexts and why it is useful in
the case of electronic voting. In particular, if the ciphertexts are correctly shuffled
before being sent to the decryption entity, the relationship between voters and their
votes can be completely removed. The shuffling is done sequentially by a chain
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of mix-servers, all of which need to efficiently prove that it shuffles correctly, and
efficiently verify that the previous mix-servers computed their shuffles correctly.
This chapter contains the most interesting scenario compared to previous
chapters, as it contains the bulk of the author’s research work, culminating in
the following two papers included in this thesis.
• Fauzi, P., Lipmaa, H.: Efficient Culpably Sound NIZK Shuffle Argument
without Random Oracles. In: Sako, K. (ed.) CT-RSA 2016. LNCS, vol.
9610, pp. 200–216. Springer International Publishing, San Franscisco, CA,
USA (February 29–March 4, 2016).
This paper proposes a new and more efficient shuffle argument in the CRS
model, based on a new computational assumption. The main technical nov-
elty of this paper is the use of this new computational assumption in ad-
dition to recent results in square-span programs [30] to create a culpably
sound shuffle argument. The author constructed a sub-argument and the
full shuffle argument and its security proof, which was later perfected by
his supervisor (and co-author). The author also improved the security proof
of a sub-argument and the new computational assumption, which led to an
optimized shuffle argument.
• Fauzi, P., Lipmaa, H., Zaja˛c, M.: A Shuffle Argument Secure in the Generic
Model. In: Cheon, J.H., Takagi, T. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2016 (2). LNCS, vol.
10032, pp. 841–872. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Hanoi, Vietnam (Dec 4–8
2016).
This paper proposes an even more efficient shuffle argument, where the
biggest improvement is in verifier’s complexity, which is the bottleneck for
electronic voting protocols based on mix networks. Another notable dif-
ference from the previous paper is that we achieve soundness (instead of
culpable soundness) without knowledge assumptions, and we get sound-
ness proof in the generic bilinear group model. Moreover, the soundness
proof of the full shuffle argument can be automated. The author’s main
contributions are related to the use of automated tools to aid in modifying
and checking the security of sub-arguments, the use of batching to improve
verification efficiency, and proving the resulting argument stays sound and
zero-knowledge.
Chapter 6 summarizes the author’s work related to NIZK arguments in the CRS
model. It contains a summary of the specific scenarios and the contributions of
the author’s work in these scenarios. The chapter also shows where the author’s
work can be improved even further.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
In this chapter, we define the common notation and important definitions used
throughout this thesis. Note that some notation and definitions used in this thesis
are slightly different compared to that used in the original publications, but are still
equivalent. This is done to unify any difference in notation between the original
publications.
2.1 Basic Notation
We define Z to be the set of integers, and N be the set of positive integers. For
integers A ≤ B, define [A ..B] = {A,A+ 1, · · · , B}. For sets G,H , let G ×
H = {(g, h)|g ∈ G, h ∈ H}. For a finite set S, let |S| be the size of the set. For
x ∈ N, let ‖x‖ = blog2 (x)c+ 1 be the length of x in bits.
Definition 1. A function f : N → Z is negligible if it decreases faster than
1/P (κ) for any polynomial P . That is, f is negligible if for any polynomial P ,
there exists a constant N0 ∈ N such that for all κ > N0,
|f(κ)| < 1
P (κ)
.
Similarly, a function f is noticeable if it grows faster than 1/P (κ) for some poly-
nomial P . Additionally, a function f is non-negligible if it is not a negligible
function, and it is overwhelming if 1− f is negligible.
An example of a negligible function is f(κ) = 2−κ. An example of a no-
ticeable function is f(κ) = 2/κ. Note that a non-negligible function need not be
noticeable. For example, f(κ) = 1+(−1)
κ
2 is neither negligible nor noticeable. We
denote poly(κ) to mean an unspecified function polynomial in κ, and negl(κ) to
mean an unspecified function negligible in κ.
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2.2 Groups
Definition 2. Given a set G and operation ◦, (G, ◦) is a group if the following
conditions hold.
1. The operation ◦ is associative and closed in G.
2. G contains an identity element (denoted as 1G) such that for all g ∈ G
1G ◦ g = g ◦ 1G = g .
3. Every g ∈ G has an inverse in G (denoted by g−1) such that
g−1 ◦ g = g ◦ g−1 = 1G .
Moreover, if ◦ is commutative then we have an Abelian group. If the operation
is obvious from the context, we will write the group as just G. An element g ∈ G
is a generator of G if for all h ∈ G there exists an integer i such that h = gi. If
a group has a generator, then it is cyclic, in which case it is also abelian. In this
work, we primarily use groups of prime order, which are always cyclic.
Let G,H be groups of order p. Then the direct product G × H with the
operation component-wise multiplication is also a group. The product and expo-
nentiation operations are defined as follows.
• For (g, h), (g′, h′) ∈ G×H: (g, h) · (g′, h′) = (g · g′, h · h′).
• For (g, h) ∈ G×H and a ∈ Zp: (g, h)a = (ga, ha).
For a group G, define G∗ to be the set of non-identity elements in G. For a group
G, a group element g ∈ G and a finite set of integers S = (s1, · · · , sn), define
gS = (gs1 , · · · , gsn).
2.3 Bilinear Maps
Let A, B, and C be additive groups over a field F . A map f : A × B → C is
bilinear if it is linear in both arguments. That is, the following conditions hold.
• For all a1, a2 ∈ A, b ∈ B: f(a1 + a2, b) = f(a1, b) + f(a2, b).
• For all a ∈ A, b1, b2 ∈ B: f(a, b1 + b2) = f(a, b1) + f(a, b2).
• For all a ∈ A, b ∈ B and scalar c ∈ F : f(c ·a, b) = c · f(a, b) = f(a, c · b).
In cryptography, we define bilinear maps with added properties, and often call
it a pairing [5]. It is also common to use multiplicative notation.
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Definition 3. Let G1,G2,GT be cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p.
A function eˆ : G1 × G2 → GT is a bilinear map (or pairing) if the following
properties hold.
• For all g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2, a, b,∈ Zp: eˆ(ga1 , gb2) = eˆ(g1, g2)ab.
• The map eˆ is efficiently computable.
• The map eˆ is non-degenerate, i.e., if g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2 are not identity
elements, then neither is eˆ(g1, g2) ∈ GT .
2.4 Additive Combinatorics
The following notation is from Tao and Vu [83]. For sets X1, X2 and integer k,
define the following operations.
Table 2.1: Operations in additive combinatorics
Operation name Definition
Sum X1 +X2 = {x1 + x2 | x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2}
Difference X1 −X2 = {x1 − x2 | x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2}
Iterated sumset For k > 0, kX = {x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xk | xi ∈ X}
Dilation k ·X = {kx | x ∈ X}
Restricted sumset 2̂X = {x1 + x2 | x1, x2 ∈ X,x1 6= x2}
Definition 4. A set S of integers is progression-free if no three distinct elements
create an arithmetic progression.
Note that if xi, xj , xk ∈ S with xi < xj < xk are an arithmetic progression,
then xj − xi = xk − xj ⇐⇒ xi + xk = 2xj . If S is progression-free, then
this only happens when i = j = k. Using additive notation, a progression-free S
must satisfy 2̂S ∩ 2 · S = ∅. Since 2 · S ∪ 2̂S = 2S, then S is progression-free
iff 2S can be partitioned into 2̂S and 2 · S.
For a positive integerN , let r3(N) be the cardinality of the largest progression-
free set S ⊆ [1 .. N ]. The best known lower bound for r3(N) is given by Elkin [36].
Theorem 1. LetN ∈ N, and let r3(N) be the cardinality of the largest progression-
free set S ⊆ [1 .. N ]. Then
r3(N) = Ω
(
N · log1/4N
22
√
2 log2N
)
.
18
From Theorem 1, we can also get a rough upper bound for r−13 (N), the small-
est value sN such that the set [1 .. sN ] contains a progression-free set of size N .
Corollary 1. Let N ∈ N, and let r−13 (N) be the smallest value sN such that the
set [1 .. sN ] contains a progression-free set of size N . Then
r−13 (N) = N
1+o(1) .
Proof. Let k = r−13 (N). Then by Theorem 1 and using the fact that r3 is increas-
ing, we get that
N = r3(k) = Ω
(
k · log1/4 k
22
√
2 log2 k
)
.
But
k · log1/4 k
22
√
2 log2 k
= k1−o(1). Moreover, by definition N ≤ k. So we get that
N = k1−o(1), which implies k = N1+o(1).
2.5 Multisets
Definition 5. A multiset is an object which is similar to a set, but with the added
property that an element can appear multiple times.
For example, A = {a, a, b, b, c} and B = {a, a, b, c, c, c} are different mul-
tisets, but are equivalent as sets. Here, the difference is that the element b has
multiplicity 2 in A, but has multiplicity 1 in B, and the element c has multiplicity
1 in A, but has multiplicity 3 in B.
Multiset operations are analogous to the corresponding set operations, but
with the difference that the multiplicity of each element is taken into account.
For multiset union we take the maximum multiplicity for each element, while for
multiset intersection, we take the minimum multiplicity for each element. More-
over, we have an added operation unionmulti called multiset sum, where the multiplicity of
each element is added. (Further details can be seen in [82].) Using the previous
example, we can see that A ∪ B = {a, a, b, b, c, c, c}, A ∩ B = {a, a, b, c}, and
A unionmulti B = {a, a, a, a, b, b, b, c, c, c, c}.
2.6 Linear Algebra
Let n be the dimension of vectors. Define 0n to be the vector of all zeros, and 1n
to be the vector of all ones. For two vectors a, b of length n, define the Hadamard
product a ◦ b to be the vector c such that for all i ∈ [1 .. n], ci = aibi.
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For a matrix M , we denote the transpose of M by MT . For the rest of this
discussion, we assume that vector and matrix elements are in the field Zp for a
prime p.
A unit vector e is a vector that has 1 one and n−1 zeros. A 1-sparse vector is
a vector that has at most one non-zero element, i.e. it is of the form ke for some
constant k and unit vector e. The following lemma that characterizes unit vectors
is a folklore result.
Lemma 1. A vector a ∈ Znp is a unit vector iff the following two conditions hold.
1. a ◦ a = a.
2.
n∑
i=1
ai = 1.
Proof. ( =⇒ ) If a is a unit vector, then it obviously satisfies the two conditions.
(⇐= ) Assume both conditions hold for a vector a. Then from the first condition,
we have that a2i = ai, so ai ∈ {0, 1}. Hence for some k ∈ [1 .. n], a contains k
one and n− k zeros. But from the second condition, 1 =
n∑
i=1
ai = k. Hence a is
a unit vector.
A permutation matrix is a square matrix that is obtained by permuting the rows
of the identity matrix In, based on some permutation ψ. The following lemma
(and its corollary) that characterizes permutation matrices is also a folklore result,
a proof of which can be found in [71].
Lemma 2. A square matrix M ∈ Zn×nq with rows (M i)ni=1 is a permutation
matrix iff the following two conditions hold.
1. For i ∈ [1 .. n],MTi is a 1-sparse vector.
2. Every column ofM sums to 1. (Equivalently,
n∑
i=1
M i = 1n.)
Corollary 2. A square matrix M ∈ Zn×nq with rows (M i)ni=1 is a permutation
matrix iff the following two conditions hold.
1. For i ∈ [1 .. n],MTi is a unit vector.
2. Every column ofM sums to 1. (Equivalently,
n∑
i=1
M i = 1n.)
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2.7 Computational Assumptions
Mathematical proofs use a technique called reduction, where the fact to be proven
is reduced to a previously known fact. In complexity theory and cryptography,
proving a certain problem is hard is done by a series of mathematically sound
steps to reduce this problem to a previously known problem which is assumed to
be hard. If the reduction is done in polynomial time, then these two problems are
said to be polynomial-time equivalent.
In complexity theory, most problems are measured by hardness in the worst
case. However, in cryptography, we are most interested in hardness of computa-
tional problems in the average case. Moreover, security is defined for some par-
ticular input of some fixed size. This introduces non-uniformity, as an adversary
may be given this input as an advice string to help solve computational problems
of the same size. For a cryptographic scheme to be secure against a non-uniform
probabilistic polynomial time (NUPPT) adversary, breaking the scheme must be
equivalent to solving a problem which is hard in the average case. Hardness in the
average case means that a NUPPT adversary has negligible probability of solving
the problem.
In some complexity classes, e.g. EXP and PSPACE, worst-case hardness
implies average-case hardness [77]. However, there is no known worst-case to
average-case reduction for NP-complete problems. Hence in cryptography we
use problems that are assumed to be hard in the average case instead of concrete
NP-complete problems.
We will now list the computational assumptions that are used in this work.
We always assume a NUPPT adversary A, who is successful if he can output
a solution to the computational problem with probability non-negligible in the
security parameter κ.
The following assumptions are related to a single group generator Gen which
is assumed to output a group description gk = (p,G). For example, if the X
assumption holds for the chosen Gen, then we say that Gen is X-secure. We
assume that the adversary also gets a generator g of G. These two assumptions
are classical and have been well-studied.
1. DL (Discrete Log, [73]) assumption: given values (g, gχ) for a random
χ ∈ Zp, A has negligible probability of producing χ.
Pr[gk← Gen(1κ), χ←r Zp,A(gk; (g, gχ)) = χ] = negl(κ) .
2. DDH (Decisional Diffie-Hellman, [14]) assumption: given values
(g, ga, gb, gc), where c = (1− x)ab+ xr for a random x ∈ {0, 1} and ran-
dom a, b, r ∈ Zp,A has 1/2±negl(κ) probability of successfully guessing
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whether c = ab or c is random.∣∣∣∣∣Pr
[
gk← Gen(1κ), a, b, r ←r Zp, x←r {0, 1},
c← (1− x)ab+ xr,A(gk; (g, ga, gb, gc)) = x
]
− 1/2
∣∣∣∣∣ = negl(κ) .
The following assumptions are related to a chosen bilinear map generator BP
which is assumed to output a group description gk = (p,G1,G2,GT , eˆ). For
example, if the X assumption holds for the chosen BP, then we say that BP is
X-secure. We assume that BP depends on both the security parameter κ and a
value n = poly(κ) which we call the input length. We also assume that d(n) and
d∗(n) are two functions such that 1 < d(n) < d∗(n) = poly(κ), χ is generated
randomly. Let φ = (φi)ni=0 be a tuple of linearly independent polynomials of
degree at most d(n). Let g1 be a generator of G1 and let g2 be a generator of G2.
The XDH and 2-ILin assumptions are standard and have been well-studied. The
PSDL, PCDH and TSDH assumptions are less known but still well-established in
the literature of non-interactive zero-knowledge in the common reference string
model.
1. XDH (eXternal Diffie-Hellman, [2]) assumption in G1: the DDH assump-
tion holds in G1, even if the adversary can access all groups (G1,G2,GT )
and the bilinear map eˆ.∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Pr
 gk← BP(1
κ, n), a, b, r ←r Zp,
x←r {0, 1}, c← (1− x)ab+ xr,
A(gk; (g1, g
a
1 , g
b
1, g
c
1)) = x
− 1/2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = negl(κ) .
2. 2-ILin (2-Incremental Linear, [38]) assumption in G1. For a matrix A =
(aij) ∈ Zm×np , define
[A]1 =
g
a1,1
1 · · · ga1,n1
...
. . .
...
g
am,1
1 · · · gam,n1
 ∈ Gm×n1 ,
and define D to be the matrix distribution
D =
a 00 a+ 1
1 1
 ∈ Z3×2p , a←r Zp .
Given A taken from the distribution D, A cannot distinguish [Aw]1 for a
random vector w and [u]1 for a random vector u. In other words,
||ε1 − ε0| − 1/2| = negl(κ) ,
22
where
ε0 = Pr
[
gk← BP(1κ, n),A← D,w ← Z2p,A(gk; [A]1, [Aw]1) = 1
]
,
ε1 = Pr
[
gk← BP(1κ, n),A← D,u← Z3p,A(gk; [A]1, [u]1) = 1
]
.
3. φ-PSDL (Power Symmetric Discrete Logarithm, [67]) assumption:
Pr
[
gk← BP(1κ, n), χ←r Zp :
A(gk; (g
ϕ(χ)
1 , g
ϕ(χ)
2 )ϕ∈Φ) = χ
]
= negl(κ) .
If φ = (Xj)d(n)j=0 , this is also known as the d(n)-PSDL assumption.
4. (d(n), d∗(n))-PCDH (Power Computational Diffie-Hellman, [56, 49]) as-
sumption:
Pr
[
gk← BP(1κ, n), χ←r Zp :
A(gk; ((g1, g2)
χi)i∈[0,d∗(n)]\{d(n)+1}) = g
χd(n)+1
1
]
= negl(κ) .
5. d(n)-TSDH (Target Strong Diffie-Hellman, [16, 76]) assumption:
Pr

gk← BP(1κ, n), χ←r Zp :
A
(
gk; ((g1, g2)
χi)
d(n)
i=0
)
=
(
r, eˆ(g1, g2)
1/(χ−r)
)
∧ r 6= χ
 = negl(κ) .
2.8 Knowledge Assumptions
In a knowledge assumption, we assume that if an adversary A can produce some
value (e.g. commitment) along with an accompanying value called a knowledge
component, then it essentially knows how the values were computed. This is
usually formalized using an algorithm XA called an extractor that extracts the
knowledge with a polynomial overhead. Related to this, we use the notation in-
troduced by Abe and Fehr [1], where (A,B) ← (A||XA)(S) means that if the
algorithm A on input S outputs a tuple of values A, then the algorithm XA on the
same input S outputs a tuple of values B.
In this work we will use several variants of the following knowledge assump-
tion. The definition is taken from the work of Groth [56], but generalized to match
the definition in [39].
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Definition 6. Let κ be the security parameter. Let m be the number of different
knowledge secrets in a concrete argument. Let F = (Pi)ni=0 and G1 be two tuples
of univariate polynomials, and let G2 be a tuple of m-variate polynomials.
For i ∈ [1 ..m], BP is (F ,G1,G2, γi)-PKE (Power Knowledge of Exponent)
secure if for any NUPPT adversary A there exists a NUPPT extractor XA, such
that the following probability is negligible in κ:
Pr

gk← BP(1κ, n), χ←r Zp,γ ←r Zmp ,
γ−i = (γ1, . . . , γi−1, γi+1, · · · , γm), aux← (gG1(χ)1 , gG2(χ,γ−i)2 ),
(h1, h2; (ai)
n
i=0)← (A||XA)(gk; (g1, gγi2 )F(χ), aux) :
eˆ(h1, g
γi
2 ) = eˆ(g1, h2) ∧ h1 6= g
∑n
i=0 aiPi(χ)
1
 .
We can regard aux as the common auxiliary input to A and XA that is gener-
ated by using benign auxiliary input generation [11]. The definition implies that
aux may depend on γ−i but not on γi. It is important that this auxiliary input is
benign, or else there can be a possibility that it is maliciously generated to enable
an adversary to break the PKE assumption. In fact, Bitansky et al. [11] proved
that for every choice of (F ,G1,G2, γi), there exists a (non-benign) auxiliary input
distribution and an adversary A such that any NUPPT extractor XA will fail to
extract the values (ai)ni=0 as defined in the PKE assumption.
2.9 Generic Bilinear Group Model
We will now describe a cryptographic model that describes the general activities
of a NUPPT adversary in the setting of bilinear groups. It is related to the generic
group model definition of Maurer [72], but extended to take pairings into account.
The main motivation in introducing this model is that all known attacks, given
well-chosen bilinear groups, are generic in nature.
Definition 7. Assume we have a bilinear group gk = (p,G1,G2,GT , eˆ) gener-
ated by the group generator BP(1κ, n). Consider an oracle B that can store values
from groups G1,G2,GT in internal state variables cell1, cell2, . . . , where we al-
low an infinite number of state variables. The initial state consists of some values
(cell1, cell2, . . . , cell|inp|), which are set according to some probability distribu-
tion. Each state variable celli has an accompanying type typei ∈ {1, 2, T,⊥}. For
example, if typei = 2, then celli ∈ G2. If typei = typej = k for some integers
i, j and k ∈ {1, 2, T}, then we can define celli · cellj as multiplication in Gk.
We assume initially typei = ⊥ for i > |inp|. The oracle allows computation
operations on internal state variables and queries about the internal state. No other
interaction with it is possible.
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A computation operation consists of selecting a (say, t-ary) operation f to-
gether with t + 1 indices i1, i2, . . . , it+1. Assuming inputs have the correct type,
B computes f(celli1 , . . . , cellit) and stores the result in cellit+1 .
In the generic bilinear group model (GBGM) [72, 15], a NUPPT adversary A
operates by doing a polynomial number of calls to an oracle that only allows the
set of operations Π = {·, eˆ} and a set of relations Σ = {=}, where
• On input (·, i1, i2, i3): if typei1 = typei2 6= ⊥ then set celli3 ← celli1 ·celli2
and typei3 ← typei1 .
• On input (eˆ, i1, i2, i3): if typei1 = 1 and typei2 = 2 then set celli3 ←
eˆ(celli1 , celli2) and typei3 ← T .
• On input (=, i1, i2): if typei1 = typei2 6= ⊥ and celli1 = celli2 then return
1. Otherwise return 0.
We assume that an adversary is successful if after a polynomial number of
operation queries, he makes an equality query (=, i1, i2), i1 6= i2, that returns 1,
but celli1 and celli2 are different functions of the initial state.
Essentially, this means that in the GBGM, a NUPPT adversary can only do
generic group operations to succeed. This means that if a scheme is secure in the
GBGM, the only ways to break security is by exploiting some properties in the
specific group instantiation.
In the GBGM, the adversary succeeds by finding [a]i 6= [b]i such that on input
(=, [a]i, [b]i), the GBGM oracle returns 1. If an assumption holds in the GBGM,
then an adversary has negligible probability of succeeding in such an equality test.
This usually involves the Schwartz–Zippel lemma [81, 86], defined as follows.
Lemma 3. (Schwartz–Zippel) Let F be a field, and let S be a finite subset of F.
Let F ∈ F[X1, · · · , Xn] be a non-zero multivariate polynomial of degree d ≥ 0.
Then
Pr[χ1 ←r S, χ2 ←r S, · · · , χn ←r S : F (χ1, · · · , χn) = 0] ≤ d/|S| .
Using the Schwartz–Zippel lemma, a successful equality test implies (with
overwhelming probability) a successful polynomial identity test. Proving an as-
sumption holds in the GBGM will then mean that the corresponding polynomial
F = 0 only if [a]i = [b]i.
It can be shown that all computational and knowledge assumptions we have
previously described are secure in the GBGM. For instance, Fauzi, Lipmaa and
Zhang [41] showed that the PSDL assumption holds in the GBGM. The proof that
the other assumptions hold follow a similar proof technique.
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2.10 Public Key Cryptosystems
Definition 8. A public key cryptosystem [34] (or public key encryption scheme) is
a cryptographic tool that consists of four algorithms:
• Setup: given the security parameter κ, generates the necessary group de-
scription gk. From this we can infer the message spaceM, ciphertext space
C, and randomness spaceR.
• Key generation algorithm Gen: given gk, generates a public key and secret
key pair (pk, sk).
• Encryption algorithm Enc: given a messagem ∈M, chooses a randomness
value r ∈ R and outputs a ciphertext c← Encpk(m; r). Form ∈M, define
Encpk(m) to be the distribution of encryptions of m over the ciphertext
space C.
• Decryption algorithm Dec: given a ciphertext c ∈ C and secret key sk,
outputs a message m ← Decsk(c). Decryption is deterministic, and is well
defined if for any (pk, sk) ∈ Gen(gk),m ∈M, r ∈ R,
Decsk(Encpk(m; r)) = m .
We now introduce the most common security definition used for public key
cryptosystems. There exist other security definitions, but they are not relevant to
this work.
Definition 9. A probabilistic public key cryptosystem (Setup,Gen,Enc,Dec), is
indistinguishable under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) [53] if for any NUPPT
adversary A, there is 1/2 ± negl(κ) probability of correctly distinguishing be-
tween an encryption of two messages m0,m1, even if the messages were chosen
by the adversary himself.
Formally, 2 · |ε− 1/2| = negl(κ), where
ε = Pr
[
gk← Setup(1κ), (pk, sk)← Gen(gk), (m0,m1)← A(pk),
x←r {0, 1}, r ←r R,A(gk; pk,Encpk(mx; r)) = x
]
.
2.10.1 ElGamal Cryptosystem
A well-known public key cryptosystem that is IND-CPA secure is ElGamal [35],
which is defined as follows.
• Setup(1κ): choose a group generator GGen where the DDH assumption is
assumed to hold. Set (p,G) ← GGen(1κ), and output gk ← (p,G). Here,
M = G,R = Zp, and C = G2.
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• Key generation Gen(gk): choose g ← G∗, set x←r Z∗p, h← gx and output
(pk← (g, h), sk← x).
• Encryption: given a message m ∈ G with randomizer r ∈ Zp, output
Encpk(m; r)← (gr,mhr).
• Decryption: given a ciphertext c = (c1, c2) ∈ G2, output Decsk(c) ←
c2/c
sk
1 .
Note that decryption is well defined, since for all m ∈ G, r ∈ Zp,
Decsk(Encpk(m; r)) = Decsk(g
r,mhr)
= mhr/(gr)x
= m .
A variation of ElGamal known as lifted ElGamal is similar but withM = Zp.
The encryption algorithm is then Enc′pk(m; r) = Encpk(gm; r), and the decryp-
tion algorithm is Dec′sk(c) = logg Decsk(c). Since it requires a discrete logarithm
computation, the decryption algorithm is only efficient if the value of m is suffi-
ciently small, e.g. m < 240.
It is well-known that ElGamal (and its lifted version) is IND-CPA secure under
the DDH assumption [84]. In the bilinear group setting with group description
gk = (p,G1,G2,GT , eˆ), we can similarly define ElGamal in groupG1 withM =
G1, R = Zp, and C = G21. In this setting, ElGamal is IND-CPA secure under the
XDH assumption in G1 (the proof is similar to [84], but with DDH replaced by
XDH).
2.10.2 ILin Cryptosystem
A public key cryptosystem that is designed specifically for the bilinear group set-
ting is ILin [38]. Escala et al. proved that it is IND-CPA secure under the 2-ILin as-
sumption. The ILin cryptosystem can be IND-CPA secure in cases when ElGamal
is not, and hence ILin is the better alternative in such situations. For ciphertexts in
G1, it can be defined as follows.
• Setup(1κ): choose a bilinear map generator BP where the 2-ILin assump-
tion is assumed to hold. Set (p,G1,G2,GT , eˆ) ← BP(1κ), and output
gk← (p,G1,G2,GT , eˆ). Here,M = G1,R = Z2p, and C = G31.
• Key generation Gen(gk): choose g ← G∗1, set x←r Zp \ {0,−1} , h← gx
and output (pk← (g, h), sk← x).
• Encryption: given a message m ∈ Zp with randomizers s1, s2 ∈ Zp, output
Encpk(m; s1, s2)← (hs1 , (gh)s2 , gm+s1+s2) .
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• Decryption: given a ciphertext c = (c1, c2, c3) ∈ G31, output
Decsk(c1, c2, c3)← logg(c3 · c−1/(sk+1)2 · c−1/sk1 ) .
Note that decryption is well defined, since for all m, s1, s2 ∈ Zp,
Decsk(Encpk(m; s1, s2)) = Decsk(h
s1 , (gh)s2 , gmgs1+s2)
= logg(g
mgs1+s2 · (gh)−s2/(sk+1) · h−s1/sk)
= logg(g
mgs1+s2 · g−s2 · g−s1)
= logg(g
m)
= m .
2.10.3 Homomorphic Properties
Definition 10. Consider a probabilistic public key cryptosystem with message
space M with group operation ∗, and ciphertext space C with group operation
◦. It is homomorphic [80] if for all m1,m2 ∈ M, Encpk(m1) ◦ Encpk(m2) =
Encpk(m1 ∗ m2). If the operation ∗ is multiplication, then the cryptosystem is
multiplicatively homomorphic. If the operation ∗ is addition, then the cryptosys-
tem is additively homomorphic.
The ElGamal cryptosystem is multiplicatively homomorphic, since
Encpk(m1; r1) ·Encpk(m2; r2) = Encpk(m1 ·m2; r1 +r2). The ILin cryptosystem
is additively homomorphic, since Encpk(m1; s1, s2) · Encpk(m2; s′1, s′2) =
Encpk(m1 +m2; s1 + s
′
1, s2 + s
′
2).
2.11 Trapdoor Commitment Schemes
Definition 11. A trapdoor commitment scheme [46] is a cryptographic tool that
consists of two algorithms:
• Commitment key generation algorithm gencom: given the security param-
eter κ, outputs a commitment key ck and a trapdoor (or equivocation key)
td.
• Commitment algorithm Com: given a message m ∈ M and randomness
r ∈ R, outputs a commitment c ← Comck(m; r). For m ∈ M, define
Comck(m) to be the distribution of commitments of m over the commit-
ment space.
The two algorithms must be efficient to compute, and satisfy the following secu-
rity properties.
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• Perfectly hiding: commitments to any two messages have the same distri-
bution. That is, for any m0,m1 ∈M and commitment key ck,
Comck(m0) = Comck(m1) .
In this sense, a commitment algorithm “hides” the original message.
• Computationally binding: given a commitment, an adversary (without ac-
cess to the trapdoor) has negligible probability of opening the commitment
to two different messages. That is, for any NUPPT A,
Pr
[
ck← gencom(1κ), (m0, r0,m1, r1)← A(ck) :
m0 6= m1 ∧ Comck(m0; r0) = Comck(m1; r1)]
]
= negl(κ) .
In this sense, a commitment algorithm “binds” the original message to its
commitment.
• Trapdoor: given access to the trapdoor, a commitment and the original mes-
sage and randomness values used to compute it, one can open the commit-
ment to any other message. That is, for any m0,m1 ∈ M, there exists
trapdoor opening algorithm that, given input (ck, td;m0,m1; r), outputs
a value rtd such that Comck(m0; r) = Comck(m1; rtd), where the distri-
bution of “normal” openings (m0, r) and trapdoor openings (m1, rtd) are
identical.
Note that ElGamal can be viewed as a perfectly binding and computationally
hiding (non-trapdoor) commitment scheme. Assume we work in a group G of
prime order p, and given a generator g ∈ G. The most well known trapdoor
commitment scheme to commit to an integerm ∈ Zp is the Pedersen commitment
scheme [78] defined as follows.
• Commitment key generation: Generate x ←r Zp, and set h = gx. Output
ck = (g, h) and td = x.
• Commitment: Generate r ←r Zp, and output Comck(m; r) = gmhr.
• Trapdoor: Given m, r and c = Comck(m; r) = gmhr, one can open to any
m′ ∈ Zp using rtd = r + m−m′x .
Using Pedersen, we can commit to a vector m ∈ Znp using n separate com-
mitments. However, in some cases we want a commitment to a vector to be in-
dependent to the length of the vector. This can be done by the extended Pedersen
commitment scheme [33] defined as follows.
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• Commitment key generation: Generate x, x1, · · · , xn ←r Zp, and set h =
gx, g1 = g
x1 , · · · , gn = gxn . Output ck = (g, h, g1, · · · , gn) and td =
(x, x1, · · · , xn).
• Commitment: Generate r ←r Zp, and output
Comck(m; r) = h
r
n∏
i=1
gmii .
• Trapdoor: Same as the Pedersen commitment scheme.
Using the extended Pedersen commitment scheme, a commitment of a vector
m ∈ Znp is just one group element. Both the Pedersen and extended Pedersen
commitment schemes are perfectly hiding and computationally binding under the
DL assumption.
2.11.1 Polynomial Commitment Schemes
The extended Pedersen commitment scheme can be further generalized into a
family of polynomial commitment schemes [56, 67] which we name PolyCommit.
The trapdoor td = (x, x1, · · · , xn) in extended Pedersen is replaced by a set
of polynomials (Pi(X))ni=0 evaluated at a random point X = χ, and the new
trapdoor will then be td = χ.
Definition 12. Assume we work in a group G of prime order p, and given a
generator g ∈ G. Let (Pi(X))ni=0 be a tuple of polynomials. The (Pi(X))ni=0-
PolyCommit scheme in G can be defined as follows.
• Commitment key generation: Generate χ←r Zp, and set h = gP0(χ), h1 =
gP1(χ), · · · , hn = gPn(χ). Output ck = (g, h, h1, · · · , hn) and td = χ.
• Commitment: Generate r ←r Zp, and output
Comck(m; r) = h
r
n∏
i=1
hmii = g
rP0(χ)+
n∑
i=1
miPi(χ)
.
A general constraint in the choice of the polynomials (Pi(X))ni=0 is that they
are linearly independent (otherwise, the binding property can easily be broken).
Under a computational assumption, this is also sufficient to get a perfectly hid-
ing and computationally binding commitment scheme. Some known choice of
polynomials for PolyCommit are as follows.
• (Groth [56]) Pi(X) = Xi for i ∈ [0 .. n].
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• (Lipmaa [67]) Pi(X) = Xλi for a distinct set of integers (λi)ni=0.
• (Lipmaa [69]) Let ω be a primitive n-th root of unity modulo p, and ωi =
ωi−1 for i ∈ [1 .. n]. Set P0(X) =
∏n
i=1(X − ωi) and for i ∈ [1 .. n] set
Pi(X) to be the Lagrange polynomial Pi(X) =
∏
j 6=i
X−ωj
ωi−ωj .
PolyCommit can also be defined in the bilinear group setting with gk =
(p,G1,G2,GT , eˆ). Assume that g1 is a generator of Gi and g2 is a generator
of G2. Then a commitment in G1 will be of the form
c = g
rP0(χ)+
n∑
i=1
miPi(χ)
1 .
Assuming the polynomials (Pi(X))ni=0 are linearly independent, (Pi(X))
n+1
i=0 -
PolyCommit is perfectly hiding and computationally binding under the (Pi(X))n+1i=0 -
PDL assumption [41].
To guarantee that the committer knows what vector he commits to, we can
additionally add a knowledge component of the form
c˜ = (gγ2 )
rP0(χ)+
n∑
i=1
miPi(χ)
for a knowledge secret γ. Under the PKE assumption, if the commitment is done
inG1 with a knowledge component inG2 (or vice versa), there exists an extractor
that can extract the committed vector [55].
2.12 Zero-knowledge Proofs
Let R be a binary relation, and let L = {x | ∃w : (x,w) ∈ R} be a group-
dependent language. It is usually assumed thatL ∈ NP, hence one can efficiently
verify whether or not (x,w) ∈ R. Let L¯ = {x | x 6∈ L}.
In an interactive proof [51], a prover tries to convince a verifier, by an ex-
change of messages, that a statement x is in the language L. An interactive proof
has two properties, as follows.
• Completeness: if x ∈ L, an honest verifier will accept the prover’s proof.
• Soundness: if x ∈ L¯, a malicious prover can not provide a convincing proof
to an honest verifier.
A common three round interactive proof used in cryptography is a sigma pro-
tocol [9], where the three messages are known as commitment, challenge, and
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Figure 2.1: Interactive proof illustration. The prover and verifier exchange messages until
the verifier either accepts or rejects the proof. Previous messages in the interaction may
be used to create subsequent ones.
response. If the proof consists of just one message from the prover to the verifier,
we get a non-interactive proof [32].
An easy way to achieve a short (and non-interactive) proof is for the prover to
send w to the verifier, where the verifier can quickly check whether (x,w) ∈ R.
However, this will give away the witness w, meaning the verifier can later prove
the same statement x to another verifier.
On the other extreme, we would like to prove a statement x ∈ L without
giving anything away to the verifier about the value w, besides that which can
be derived without interacting with the prover. A proof with such a property
is known as a zero-knowledge proof [54]. If soundness is guaranteed only for
NUPPT algorithms, then we instead get a zero-knowledge argument.
There are two common models to make an argument non-interactive.
• Random oracle (RO) model [50]. In this model, we assume the existence
of one or more random oracles that respond to every (unique) query with
a uniformly random value from its output domain. Both the prover and
verifier can access these random oracles. The RO model makes use of the
fact that an honest verifier’s messages to the prover should be uniformly
random, and do not depend on the prover’s messages. Using the so-called
Fiat-Shamir heuristic [45], each message the verifier needs to send in an
argument is omitted, and is instead replaced by a random oracle query. The
argument thus becomes a single message from the prover to the verifier.
• Common reference string (CRS) model [23]. In the CRS model, we assume
the existence of a trusted party that can generate a common string that can
be referenced by both the prover and verifier. This common reference string
in a way incorporates part of an honest verifier’s reply to the prover, and is
independent to the statement to be proven. It must be correctly generated
so that the proof can be complete, sound, and zero-knowledge. The CRS is
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only generated once, but can be used for multiple interactions.
Figure 2.2: Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof in the CRS model.
Security proofs in the CRS model are more convincing than the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic used in the RO model. The Lindell [66] and Ciampi et al. [29] transforms
can be used to improve heuristic security compared to the Fiat-Shamir heuristic,
but they use both RO and CRS.
Moreover, there are two models which can be seen as relaxations of the CRS
model: the registered public key (RPK) model, and the bare public key (BPK)
model.
• In the RPK model [4], a verifier’s randomness is incorporated into a public
key that is registered in a central authority. The public key can either be
generated randomly by the central authority, or generated by the verifier
itself. In the latter case, the verifier must send the private data related to
the public key to a central authority, who then checks that it meets some
set requirements. A prover who wants to send a proof to a verifier, must
first query the verifier’s public key from the central authority, and from that
generate the proof.
• In the BPK model [24], a verifier’s randomness is again incorporated into
a public key, but differently to the RPK model, this public key need not
be checked by a central authority. In this model, extra steps are needed to
guard against a dishonest verifier who generates a malicious public key.
Note that in both cases, the non-interactive proof can only be verified if one
knows the secret key of the designated verifier, and hence is only valid and check-
able by a single verifier. This means that NIZK arguments in the BPK and RPK
models are not transferable. While this in itself is not a bad thing, it can becomes
a problem if one wants to prove the same statement to several different verifiers.
We now define non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments in the CRS model.
The following is a high-level version of the formal definitions given by Fauzi and
Lipmaa [39].
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Definition 13. Let R be a binary relation, and let L = {x | ∃w : (x,w) ∈ R} be
a group-dependent language. A non-interactive zero-knowledge argument [54] in
the CRS model consists of four algorithms.
• Setup algorithm BP(1κ, n): generates the bilinear group description gk =
(p,G1,G2,GT , eˆ).
• CRS generation algorithm gencrs(gk): generates the common reference
string crs and a trapdoor td. Although the prover and verifier can access
the same crs, it may only require part of it to preform its computation. The
part that the prover needs to compute a proof is denoted crsp, while the part
that the verifier needs to verify a proof is denoted crsv. This separation of
the CRS is only needed for efficiency.
• Prover pro: outputs an argument pi = pro(gk, crsp;x,w).
• Verifier ver: outputs ver(gk, crsv;x, pi) which is either accept or reject.
The desired properties of an argument are as follows.
• Perfectly complete: if the prover is honest and x ∈ L, an honest verifier
always accepts prover’s proof. Formally,
Pr
[
gk← BP(1κ, n), ((crsp, crsv), td)← gencrs(gk),
(x,w)← R(gk) : ver(gk, crsv;x, pro(gk, crsp;x,w)) = 1
]
= 1 .
• Adaptively computationally sound: for any NUPPT adversary A,
Pr
 gk← BP(1
κ, n), ((crsp, crsv), td)← gencrs(gk),
(x, pi)← A(gk, crsp, crsv) : x ∈ L¯ ∧
ver(gk, crsv;x, pi) = 1
 = negl(κ) .
Here, an adversary is adaptive in the sense that it can use the CRS in its
attempt to construct a proof of an incorrect statement.
• Perfectly zero-knowledge: there exists a simulator sim, with access to the
trapdoor td and without knowing the witness w, that can output a proof pi′
such that (gk, x, crs, w, pi′) has the same distribution as (gk, x, crs, w, pi),
where pi = pro(gk, crsp;x,w) is the proof of an honest prover. That is,
there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm sim such that for any
(x,w) ∈ R and any stateful non-uniform adversary A,
Pr

gk← BP(1κ, n),
(crs, td)← gencrs(gk),
pi ← pro(gk, crsp;x,w) :
A(gk, x, crs, w, pi) = 1
 = Pr

gk← BP(1κ, n),
(crs, td)← gencrs(gk),
pi ← sim(gk, crs;x, td) :
A(gk, x, crs, w, pi) = 1
 .
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Essentially, this means that an accepting proof could have been generated by
a simulator that doesn’t know the witness, hence the verifier learns nothing
from the proof besides the correctness of the statement.
Note that the prover and simulator use the same CRS, in which case we
have same-string zero-knowledge [31]. De Santis et al. [31] proved that
the notion of perfect and same-string zero-knowledge enables the CRS to
be used an unbounded number of times to create arguments, without losing
the perfect zero-knowledge property. Moreover, Abe and Fehr [1] proved
that it is possible to create an argument for any NP language that is both
adaptively sound and perfectly zero-knowledge under the above definition.
Additionally, an argument can have the following properties. Let R∗ be
the set of all relations Rguilt which are decidable in polynomial time and con-
sist of pairs (x,wguilt) such that x 6∈ L is an incorrect statement, and wguilt
is a witness that x is an incorrect statement. For Rguilt ∈ R∗, we can define
Lguilt = {x | ∃wguilt : (x,wguilt) ∈ Rguilt}
• Adaptive culpable soundness [59]: for any binary relation Rguilt ∈ R∗ and
any NUPPT adversary A,
Pr
 gk← BP(1
κ, n), ((crsp, crsv), td)← gencrs(gk),
(x, pi, wguilt)← A(gk, crsp, crsv) :
(x,wguilt) ∈ Rguilt ∧ ver(gk, crsv;x, pi) = 1
 = negl(κ) .
Note that for any choice of Rguilt we have that Lguilt ⊆ L¯, so culpable
soundness is a weaker security notion than adaptive soundness.
• Perfectly witness-indistinguishable [44]: if (x,w0) ∈ R and (x,w1) ∈ R
for the same statement x, then pro(gk, crsp, x, w0) and pro(gk, crsp, x, w1)
have the same distribution. Essentially, this means that given a valid proof
pi, a verifier cannot know which of the valid witnesses was used to generate
the proof.
• Argument of knowledge [43]: if the verifier accepts a proof pi, then there
exists an extractor that extracts the witness w from pi. That is, for any
NUPPT adversary A, there exists a NUPPT algorithm XA such that
Pr
 gk← BP(1
κ, n), ((crsp, crsv), td)← gencrs(gk),
((x, pi);w)← (A||XA)(crsp, crsv; aux) :
(x,w) 6∈ R ∧ ver(gk, crsv;x, pi) = 1
 = negl(κ) .
As in the PKE assumption in Section 2.8, we assume aux to be a common
auxiliary input to Adv and XAdv that is generated by using benign auxiliary
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input generation. Essentially, this means that a valid proof pi shows that the
prover knows the witness w it used to generate the proof.
2.13 Techniques for NIZK in the CRS model
In this section we will briefly discuss some known techniques that can be used to
construct efficient NIZK arguments in the CRS model. We will use Square Span
Programs in the construction of shuffle arguments in Section . Although we do
not use Groth-Sahai proofs in this thesis, we will provide a brief overview as it is
a well-known technique.
2.13.1 Square Span Programs
Square span programs were defined by Danezis et al. [30] to provide a means of
checking arithmetic circuits more efficiently.
Definition 14. A square span program (SSP) Q of size m and degree d over
the field Zq is a collection of m + 1 polynomials v0(X), v1(X), . . . , vm(X) of
degree at most d and a target polynomial t(X) of degree d. We say that Q accepts
an input a ∈ Z`q iff there exist integers a`+1, · · · , am ∈ Zq satisfying
t(X) |
(
(v0(X) +
m∑
i=1
aivi(X))
2 − 1
)
.
SSP can be seen as a generalization of quadratic span programs (QSP) in-
troduced by Gennaro et al. [49], where checking whether or not a vector a sat-
isfies some properties is equivalent to checking if the target polynomial divides∑m
i=1 aivi(X))
2 − 1. Since this can be done using only one polynomial evalua-
tion, SSP leads to very efficient checking of arithmetic circuits.
2.13.2 Groth-Sahai Proofs
Groth and Sahai [60] defined a set of techniques, known as Groth-Sahai proofs,
to achieve NIZK in the CRS model for a large family of algebraic equations. In a
Groth-Sahai proof, the prover wants to prove that there are values x,y that satisfy
a set of equations simultaneously, while keeping these values private.
Let gk = (p,G1,G2,GT , eˆ) be a bilinear group description. Groth and Sahai
defined four types of algebraic equations as follows.
• Pairing product equation.
m∏
i=1
eˆ(xi, bi) ·
n∏
j=1
eˆ(aj , yj) ·
m∏
i=1
n∏
j=1
eˆ(xi, yj)
γij = tT ,
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where xi ∈ G1, yj ∈ G2 are private and ai ∈ G1, bj ∈ G2, γij ∈ Zp and
tT ∈ GT are public constants.
• Multiscalar multiplication equation in G1.
m∏
i=1
xbii ·
n∏
j=1
a
yj
j ·
m∏
i=1
n∏
j=1
x
γijyj
i = t1 ,
where xi ∈ G1, yj ∈ Zp are private and aj ∈ G1, bi ∈ Zp, γij ∈ Zp and
t1 ∈ G1 are public constants.
• Multiscalar multiplication equation in G2.
m∏
i=1
bxii ·
n∏
j=1
y
aj
j ·
m∏
i=1
n∏
j=1
y
γijxi
j = t2 ,
where xi ∈ Zp, yj ∈ G2 are private and aj ∈ Zp, bi ∈ G2, γij ∈ Zp and
t2 ∈ G2 are public constants.
• Quadratic equation in Zp.
m∑
i=1
xibi +
n∑
j=1
ajyj +
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γijxiyj = t ,
where xi, yj ∈ Zp, are private and aj , bi, γij , t ∈ Zp are public constants.
The main idea of a Groth-Sahai proof is transforming equations involving
private variables in the message space into corresponding equations in the com-
mitment space which hides the private variables. Under falsifiable [75] security
assumptions (where we can check in polynomial time if an adversarial strategy
breaks the security assumption), if the equations hold in the commitment space,
then with overwhelming probability the corresponding equations hold in the mes-
sage space.
Assume that there are K equations involving the same L = m + n private
variables (xi)i∈[1 ..m] and (yj)j∈[1 .. n]. Then the Groth-Sahai proof will require
the prover to compute and send Θ(L) commitments and Θ(K) proofs, and the
verifier has to check Θ(K) equations. In the case of a pairing product equation,
the prover will have to compute Θ(K+L) group exponentiations while the verifier
has to compute Θ(K + L) pairings.
Groth-Sahai proofs achieve good asymptotic efficiency, but the specific con-
stants involved are not small enough in practice. Escala and Groth [37] con-
structed Groth-Sahai proofs with smaller constants, but it is still not optimal. For
example, in Section 5 we will see several NIZK shuffle arguments that are more
efficient than the existing construction based on Groth-Sahai proofs.
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CHAPTER 3
MODULAR NIZK ARGUMENTS
3.1 Motivation
Many cryptographic protocols require a certain party to provide a proof that they
have expended significant amounts of resources (e.g., CPU power) before sending
a message. This is known as a proof-of-work. For example, Bitcoin uses the
Hashcash proof-of-work system [3] where the “work” consists of finding a string
x such that its hash H(x) starts with k consecutive zeroes. A typical application
is is spam e-mail filtering, where an e-mail server will filter out messages that are
not accompanied with a proof-of-work. There are two main models for showing
proof-of-work: challenge-response and verifiable computation.
In the challenge-response model, a challenger gives some challenge message
m to the prover, who must in turn respond with a correct message which solves
the challenge. The challenger then verifies the response, and only proceeds in the
protocol execution if verification succeeds. This model is interactive, which is not
ideal in many scenarios. For example, in the spam e-mail filtering scenario, an
e-mail sender need not be online after sending the e-mail.
Meanwhile, in the verifiable computation model [48], a prover both chooses
and solves a certain hard problem, and sends both the problem (in the form of a
statement) and solution (in the form of a witness) to the verifier. This can be sim-
plified by agreeing on a well-known hard language L, with easy-to-verify relation
R that consists of all statement-witness pairs (typically NP-complete languages),
where the prover sends a statement x along with a corresponding witness w. The
verifier then only needs to verify that x ∈ L and that (x,w) ∈ R. In this model,
the verifier may not have the resources to do large amounts of computation (such
as finding the correct witness w himself), so ideally verification does not require
much computation. The prover need not be online during verification.
Since we want a proof-of-work without interaction, the preferred model is ver-
ifiable computation for NP. However, in some cases of verifiable computation,
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we also want to hide the value w, since the verifier might be able to use it ma-
liciously (to breach privacy, construct his own (x′, w′) pair for another protocol
execution, etc.). However, we still want to be able to verify that the computation
was done correctly. To solve this, we need to construct a NIZK argument for NP
languages.
In a typical NIZK argument, a prover commits to the witness w, and proves
that the committed values satisfy some desired properties. Many NP languages
require that the witness is from a certain range of values (e.g., a solution to a 0-1
Integer Linear Programming problem must be a binary vector). Hence a prover
must additionally prove that he commits to a witness w from the correct range,
without revealing anything about w. This is known as a range proof [18, 70, 85,
26]. In this case, a range proof will be a building block in constructing the full
NIZK argument for that NP language. However, as we will discuss in the next
chapter, a range proof can be useful in other scenarios.
3.2 Previous Work
One of the earliest work that constructed a CRS-based NIZK argument for NP
languages was by Groth [56], which has two interesting properties. Firstly, it is
succinct, meaning the proof size is constant, and the verification time is short (at
most linear in the size of the witness). Secondly, it is modular, meaning that he
first constructs some basic NIZK arguments, including the product and permu-
tation arguments, which are then used as building blocks to construct a NIZK
argument for CIRCUIT-SAT. The product argument proves that a committed vec-
tor is a Hadamard product of two other committed vectors, and the permutation
argument proves that a committed vector is a permutation of another committed
vector.
The advantage of a modular approach is that any improvements in the basic
arguments will propagate to the main protocol. Moreover, the basic arguments
can also be used to get NIZK arguments for other languages (e.g. shuffle in [71],
see Section 5 for further discussion on shuffle) or other NP languages (see [69]
for a list). For CIRCUIT-SAT, complexity is defined through the size n of the
circuit. Groth achieved constant communication, CRS size of Θ(n2) group ele-
ments, prover’s computation of Θ(n2) exponentiations, and verifier’s computation
of Θ(n) group multiplications and Θ(1) pairings. However, if the circuit size is
large, then Θ(n2) prover’s computation is not ideal in practice.
Lipmaa [67] improved the CRS size and prover’s computation of Groth’s ba-
sic product and permutation arguments. This was done mostly by modifying
Groth’s polynomial commitment scheme, which if done correctly used n + 1
polynomials of degree up to n2, to instead use n + 1 polynomials whose degrees
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are progression-free. This is an asymptotic improvement since by Corollary 1,
r−13 (n) = n
1+o(1). Since the basic arguments are more efficient, the resulting ar-
gument for CIRCUIT-SAT is also more efficient. However, the verifier’s computa-
tion is slightly less efficient: Θ(n) exponentiations and Θ(1) pairings. Moreover,
it still suffered the same drawback as Groth’s scheme, i.e., the prover’s computa-
tion is still Θ(n2).
Gennaro et al. [49] introduced a technique that generalized the techniques
used by Groth [56] and Lipmaa [67] into a new construction, which they named
quadratic span programs (QSP).
Using a variant of QSP that efficiently computes arithmetic circuits, Gennaro
et al. constructed an asymptotically efficient NIZK argument for CIRCUIT-SAT
that has CRS size of O(n) group elements and n1+o(1) prover’s computation.
Differently from the previously mentioned constructions, the Gennaro et al. NIZK
argument for CIRCUIT-SAT is not modular.
Chaabouni, Lipmaa and Zhang [26] constructed a modular range argument
(i.e. prove that a committed value is in some range [A ..B]) using Lipmaa’s basic
product and permutation arguments [67]. The range argument has Θ(h)2 prover’s
computation and Θ(h) verifier’s computation, where h = log2(B −A).
3.3 Problem Statement
Can we construct a NIZK range argument and NIZK arguments for NP-complete
languages that is succinct but with sub-quadratic prover’s complexity? Moreover,
can we do it in a modular way?
3.4 Our Solution
We start with two basic succinct arguments, product and shift, and use them
to construct NIZK range argument and NIZK arguments for NP-complete lan-
guages in a modular way. Since the basic arguments are succinct, and in each
constructed argument we only use a constant number of basic arguments, all con-
structed argument are thus also succinct. A full description of our construction is
given in the paper [41], which is a joint work with Lipmaa and Zhang.
3.4.1 Committing to a Vector
Let S = (λ1, · · · , λn) be progression-free with λi+1 > λi, and let υ > 2λn−λ1.
We use the (Pi(X))ni=0-PolyCommit scheme of Section 2.11.1 with Pi(X) =
Xλi for i ∈ [1 .. n], and P0(X) = Xυ. We also generate a knowledge secret
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γ ←r Zp. Then
Com(a; r) = (g1, g
γ
1 )
rσυ+
∑n
i=1 aiσ
λi .
For a commitment C = (C, C˜), the value C˜ is known as the knowledge component
and is necessary to ensure the committer actually knows what vector he commits
to. This concrete choice of polynomials was first introduced by Lipmaa [67], but
instead of Lipmaa’s choice of υ = 0, we instead use a general υ > 2λn − λ1.
3.4.2 Product Argument
In a product argument [56], we aim to show that three commitments
A = Com(a; ra) ,
B = Com(b; rb) , and
C = Com(c; rc)
can be opened to a, b and c, such that the three vectors satisfy the Hadamard
product c = a ◦ b. The construction uses pairings and the fact that the set S =
(λ1, · · · , λn) used in PolyCommit is progression-free. Full details can be seen
in [41].
The resulting product argument is similar to the one by Lipmaa [67]. How-
ever, we make it even more efficient by using FFT instead of polynomial multipli-
cation to compute logg2 pi as a polynomial. This reduces the prover’s computation
from Θ(n2) to Θ(N logN), where N = r−13 (n). This is an improvement since
N logN = n1+o(1).
3.4.3 Shift, Rotation and Scan Arguments
In a shift-by-η argument, we aim to show that two commitments
A = Com(a; ra) and
B = Com(b; rb)
can be opened to a, b, where a is a right shift-by-η of b. In other words, ai = bi+η,
where we define bi = 0 when i > n. Similarly, we construct a rotation-by-η
argument where the vectors satisfy ai = bi+η if i + η ≤ n, and ai = bi+η−n
otherwise. We also construct a scan argument, where b is a scan of a if bi =∑n
j=i+1 aj . The scan argument is interesting as it enables to provide proofs that
involve the sum of elements of a committed vector. As we will see below, this is
needed as an intermediate step in various NIZK arguments for NP.
The shift and rotation arguments are simpler than the permutation argument
used in previous work [56, 67], and also much more efficient. For soundness of the
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shift and rotation arguments, we need the value υ > λn + η, which for η ∈ [1 .. n]
always holds when υ > 2λn − λ1.
3.4.4 Range Argument
Using the product and shift arguments, we construct a more efficient range argu-
ment than the one by Chaabouni et al. [26]. The efficiency gain is mostly from
rewriting the Chaabouni et al. argument to work without the permutation argu-
ment, and only using the more efficient product and shift arguments. This is pos-
sible because the permutation argument was essentially used to construct a scan
argument, which we can implement by just one shift-by-1 argument.
The resulting range argument is much simpler than the Chaabouni et al. range
argument, since we do not require a permutation argument. Since the commitment
scheme is additively homomorphic, we can assume that the interval for the range
proof is [0 .. H]. As in [26], we use the fact that x ∈ [0 .. H] iff there exist values
(bi)
‖H‖
i=1 such that bi ∈ {0, 1} and
x =
‖H‖∑
i=1
bH + 2
i−1
2i
cbi . (3.1)
We can prove that the Equation 3.1 holds using a restriction argument (that shows
the first element of a vector is zero), a scan argument and a product argument.
3.4.5 NIZK Arguments forNP
Using the product and shift arguments, we can also construct NIZK arguments
for any language in NP. In our work, we illustrate NIZK arguments for three
different NP-complete languages. Security of the various arguments for NP
follow from the security of the basic arguments. See Appendix E and Appendix F
in [41] for detailed security proofs.
SET-PARTITION
In the SET-PARTITION problem, we are given a public multiset S =
{s1, · · · , sn} of integers in Zp and must partition it into two sets X ,Y with
the same sum modulo p. This is equivalent to finding b ∈ {−1, 1}n such that∑n
i=1 bisi ≡ 0 (mod p). Hence in the SET-PARTITION argument, a prover must
provide a commitment B and prove it can be opened to a vector b that satisfies the
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conditions. The complete SET-PARTITION argument is as follows.
Algorithm 1: SET-PARTITION argument
Compute a product argument pi1 for bi · bi = 1, showing that bi ∈ {−1, 1};
Compute a product argument pi2 showing that ci = bi · si for i ∈ [1 .. n];
Compute a scan argument pi3 showing that d is the scan of c;
Compute a restriction argument pi4 showing that the first coordinate of c+ d is 0;
Let B be a commitment to b, C be a commitment to c, and D be a commitment to
d. The SET-PARTITION argument is equal to (B,C,D, pi1, . . . , pi4);
SUBSET-SUM
In the SUBSET-SUM problem, we are given a public multiset S = {s1, · · · , sn}
of integers in Zp and must find a non-empty subset T that sums to 0 (mod p).
This is equivalent to finding b ∈ {0, 1}n such that ∑ni=1 bisi ≡ 0 (mod p)
and b 6= 0n. Note that as mentioned in Section 3.4.4, b ∈ {0, 1}n can
be proven using a product argument. Moreover,
∑n
i=1 bisi = 0 can be
checked as in the SET-PARTITION argument. The only difference is that we
need to prove that b 6= 0n, which can be done using Lipmaa and Zhang’s
zero argument [71]. The complete SUBSET-SUM argument is as follows.
Algorithm 2: SUBSET-SUM argument
Compute a product argument pi1 for b2i = bi, showing that b is Boolean;
Compute an argument pi2 showing that b 6= 0;
Compute a product argument pi3 showing that ci = bi · si for i ∈ [1 .. n];
Compute a scan argument pi4 showing that d is the scan of c;
Compute a restriction argument pi5 showing that the first coordinate of c+ d is 0;
Let B be a commitment to b, C be a commitment to c, and D be a commitment to
d. The SUBSET-SUM argument is equal to (B,C,D, pi1, . . . , pi5);
DECISION-KNAPSACK
In the DECISION-KNAPSACK problem, we are given a public set S = [1 .. n]
of item indices, a public set V = {v1, · · · , vn} ∈ Nn of item values, and a public
setW = {w1, · · · , wn} ∈ Nn of item weights. We are also given a target value
V ∈ N and a weight limit W ∈ N. From these given parameters, must decide
whether or not there exists a set T ⊆ S such that∑i∈T vi ≥ V ∧∑i∈T wi ≤W .
The DECISION-KNAPSACK argument can be constructed using the range and
SUBSET-SUM arguments, see Appendix F in [41] for a detailed construction.
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3.5 Comparison with Previous Work
Similar to the NIZK arguments of Groth and Lipmaa, our NIZK arguments for
NP languages are succinct. However, unlike both mentioned work we achieve
Θ(N logN) = n1+o(1) prover’s complexity while still comparable with Groth’s
verifier’s complexity (i.e., Θ(n) group multiplications and Θ(1) pairings). If we
extend the comparison to non-modular NIZK arguments, Gennaro et al. [49] had a
slightly better prover’s complexity of n · log n3 multiplications in Zp, Θ(n) group
multiplications and Θ(n) group exponentiations. Groth, Lipmaa, and Gennaro et
al. all chose CIRCUIT-SAT as their sample NP-complete language, while we use
the SET-PARTITION, SUBSET-SUM and DECISION-KNAPSACK problems.
We summarize this comparison in Table 3.1. Note that since the choice of
NP language affects the constants, we compare asymptotic efficiency and not
the specific constants. Moreover, in the prover’s and verifier’s complexity, we
omit addition and multiplication in Zp and only consider group multiplications,
exponentiations, and pairings. We emphasize that although the NIZK arguments
for NP-complete languages are not directly comparable, we demonstrate good
efficiency for some NP-complete languages.
Table 3.1: A comparison of our NIZK arguments for NP [41] with the Groth [56],
Lipmaa [67] and Gennaro et al. [49] arguments in the CRS model. In the prover’s and
verifier’s complexity, we omit addition and multiplication in Zp and only consider group
multiplications (m), exponentiations (e), and pairings (p). The best efficiency among the
modular NIZK arguments are highlighted in bold. Note that N = r−13 (n) = n
1+o(1).
Groth Lipmaa Our result Gennaro et al.
|CRS| Θ(n2) Θ(N) Θ(N) Θ(n)
Comm. Θ(1) Θ(1) Θ(1) Θ(1)
Prover Θ(n2)e Θ(N)e Θ(N)m Θ(n)m + Θ(n)e
Verifier Θ(n)m + Θ(1)p Θ(n)e Θ(n)m + Θ(1)p Θ(n)m + Θ(1)p
NP-
complete
lang.
CIRC.-SAT CIRC.-SAT SET-
PARTITION,
SUBSET-SUM,
DECISION-
KNAPSACK
CIRC.-SAT
Modular yes yes yes no
We summarize our result in the following informal theorem.
Theorem 2. Our modular NIZK arguments for NP-complete languages are per-
fectly complete and perfectly zero-knowledge. Under the PSDL assumption, PKE
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Table 3.2: Rewriting the comparison in Table 3.1 using the parameter n only, and setting
N = r−13 (n) = n
1+o(1). The best efficiency among the modular NIZK arguments are
highlighted in bold.
Groth Lipmaa Our result Gennaro et al.
|CRS| Θ(n2) n1+o(1) n1+o(1) Θ(n)
Comm. Θ(1) Θ(1) Θ(1) Θ(1)
Prover Θ(n2)e (n1+o(1))e (n1+o(1))m Θ(n)m + Θ(n)e
Verifier Θ(n)m + Θ(1)p Θ(n)e Θ(n)m + Θ(1)p Θ(n)m + Θ(1)p
NP-
complete
lang.
CIRC.-SAT CIRC.-SAT SET-
PARTITION,
SUBSET-SUM,
DECISION-
KNAPSACK
CIRC.-SAT
Modular yes yes yes no
assumption in G1, and PKE assumption in G2, they are adaptively computation-
ally sound. Moreover, we achieve better efficiency compared to prior modular
NIZK arguments for NP-complete languages.
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CHAPTER 4
NIZK ARGUMENTS FOR SET
OPERATIONS
4.1 Motivation
In many situations, we would like to prove that we meet some requirements, but
inadvertently reveal much more in the process. For instance, if Sybil wants to
prove she is old enough to go to a casino, she must provide some personal docu-
mentation, which also contains additional information such as full name or exact
age. Meanwhile, if Dora wants to prove she has enough money to cover travel
costs in a foreign country, she will find it hard to do so without revealing how
much she actually has in the bank. In both cases, it would be preferable to prove
these facts without revealing anything else. As mentioned in the previous chapter,
a proof that some integer is in a certain range is known as a range proof.
On a related scenario, consider the voting process where you can vote for mul-
tiple candidates. In this instance, you need to prove that you voted for each can-
didate at most once, without revealing anything about who you did or didn’t vote
for. This is related to the slightly harder situation of a set membership proof [20],
where a prover must show it has chosen a value which is in the public set of
allowable values.
Any set membership proof can be adapted to a range proof, but not necessarily
the other way around. Moreover, it would be more advantageous to not only
be able to prove set membership, but other set operations as well. In this case,
a prover must prove that he commits to sets or elements that satisfy a certain
relation. However, this must not reveal any information about the individual sets
themselves. This type of proof is called a zero-knowledge proof for set operations.
In some cases, it is perfectly fine for a proof for set relations to be interactive.
But if we consider the voting scenario, voters might not always be available to
interactively prove they have acted honestly. Hence it would be more practical
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for this zero-knowledge proof for set operations to be non-interactive and trans-
ferable.
4.2 Previous Work
Kate, Zaverucha and Goldberg [63] proposed an interactive zero-knowledge proof
that a publicly known element x belongs to a committed set S, which was later
refined by Henry and Goldberg [61]. These constructions are already very effi-
cient, with linear (in set size k = |S|) prover’s computation, constant communica-
tion and constant verification. However, making this construction non-interactive
would need either a loss of efficiency or use of a random oracle.
Kissner and Song [65] constructed an interactive zero-knowledge proof for
set union and set intersection which worked with multisets. However, the proof
size, prover’s computation and verifier’s computation were all O(k). Jarecki and
Liu [62] improved this to get a zero-knowledge proof for set union with proof size,
prover’s computation and verifier’s computation all Θ(k). These constructions
can be made non-interactive but still efficient using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [45]
(in the RO model) or Ciampi et al. transform [29] (in the RO and CRS model).
4.3 Problem Statement
Is it possible to construct a NIZK argument for set operations in the CRS model
that is as efficient as the best NIZK arguments in the RO model? Moreover, is it
possible to do so for more set operations than previous work?
4.4 Our Solution
We first construct a pairwise multiset sum equality test (PMSET), which is a NIZK
argument that shows that committed multisetsA1,A2,A3,A4 satisfy the multiset
relation A1 unionmulti A2 = A3 unionmulti A4. We then use this PMSET argument as a black
box to create NIZK arguments for various set operations. A full description of
our construction is given in the paper [42], which is a joint work with Lipmaa and
Zhang.
4.4.1 Committing to a Multiset
To commit (in G1) to a multiset A of cardinality at most k, we first encode A as
a polynomial fA(X) =
∏
a∈A
(X − a) ∈ Zp[X], taking multiplicity into account.
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For some values a¯ ∈ Zk+1p , this can be rewritten as
fA(X) =
k∑
i=0
a¯iX
i .
We then commit to a¯ using the (Pi(X))ki=0-PolyCommit scheme of Section 2.11.1
with Pi(X) = Xi and P0(X) = Xυ = Xk+1. So we get the commitment
Com1(A; r) = gfA(χ)+rχ
υ
1 = g
rχυ+
∑k
i=0 a¯iχ
i
1 .
The commitment scheme is similarly defined inG2, and is denoted byCom2(A; r).
To achieve soundness of the PMSET argument, we need to commit in bothG1 and
G2.
4.4.2 The PMSET Argument
To get the PMSET argument, we use the fact that A1 unionmulti A2 = A3 unionmulti A4 iff
fA1(X)fA2(X) = fA3(X)fA4(X). But if fA1(χ)fA2(χ) − fA3(χ)fA4(χ) = 0
for some χ←r Zp, then by the Schwartz–Zippel lemma, we have that with over-
whelming probability, fA1(X)fA2(X) − fA3(X)fA4(X) = 0 as a polynomial.
Hence it suffices to show that fA1(χ)fA2(χ) = fA3(χ)fA4(χ).
If the multiset commitments were not randomized, then we can just check that
eˆ(g
fA1 (χ)
1 , g
fA2 (χ)
2 ) = eˆ(g
fA3 (χ)
1 , g
fA4 (χ)
2 ) .
To keep the multisets private, we replace g
fA1 (χ)
1 byD1 = Com1(A1; r1), g
fA2 (χ)
2
by D2 = Com2(A2; r2), etc. We then get an equation of the form
eˆ(D1, D2) = eˆ(D3, D4) · eˆ(g1, gE2 ) , where
E = (fA1(χ) + r1χ
υ)(fA2(χ) + r2χ
υ)− (fA3(χ) + r3χυ)(fA4(χ) + r4χυ)
accounts for the use of randomness in the commitments.
However, to achieve soundness we essentially need to commit to each multiset
in both G1 and G2, resulting in commitments Cj , Dj for each Aj , j ∈ [1 .. 4].
This will make the final PMSET argument more complicated, e.g., we need to
also prove that Cj and Dj commit to the same multiset, which requires an extra
secret variable and extra knowledge components for j ∈ [1 .. 4].
The resulting PMSET argument is perfectly complete, perfectly zero knowl-
edge, computationally sound and an argument of knowledge under the PSDL and
PKE assumptions. We achieve linear (in the number of set elements) CRS and
prover’s complexity, and constant communication and verifier’s complexity.
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4.4.3 Applications of PMSET
The PMSET argument can be used as a black box to construct various set oper-
ations. For instance, to prove A ⊆ B, we can produce a multiset C such that
A unionmulti C = B unionmulti ∅. To prove a multiset A is a set, we first publish a public set
U which contains all the allowed elements in the multiset. Then we show that
A ⊆ U .
Set intersection and set union are less obvious to construct. We do this si-
multaneously, i.e., we prove four committed (multi)sets A,B,C,D satisfy both
C = A ∩B and D = A ∪B iff all the following properties hold:
• A unionmultiB = C unionmultiD,
• C ⊆ A and C ⊆ B, and
• A,B,D are sets.
Using a similar trick, we can also get set difference. However, we did not achieve
multiset intersection, multiset union, or multiset difference.
Additionally, the PMSET argument can be used to construct cryptographic
accumulators [10], where given a committed set S and a public integer k, one has
to provide a short proof of either k ∈ S or k 6∈ S. Using PMSET, an accumulator
can be defined as follows.
• To prove k ∈ S, create a PMSET argument proving {k}∪S′ = S for some
committed multiset S′, and a PMSET argument proving S is a set.
• To prove k 6∈ S, create a PMSET argument proving {k} ∪ S′ = U \ S for
some committed multiset S′, and a PMSET argument proving S′ is a set.
Furthermore, we can implement a dynamic accumulator [22], where one can
dynamically add or delete from an accumulated set. Let S be the set to be ac-
cumulated. Using PMSET, we can define the dynamic add and dynamic delete
operations as follows.
• Dynamic add: show that k 6∈ S, then with S′ defined as the set such that
{k} ∪ S′ = U \ S, use the commitment to U \ S′ as the accumulator for
S ∪ {k}.
• Dynamic delete: show that k ∈ S, then with S′ defined as the set such that
{k} ∪ S′ = S, use the commitment to S′ as the accumulator for S \ {k}.
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Table 4.1: A comparison of our NIZK arguments for set operations [42] with the Kate et
al. [63], Kissner-Song [65] and Jarecki-Liu [62] arguments in the RO model.
Kate et al. Kissner-Song Jarecki-Liu Our result
|CRS| Θ(k) - Θ(1) Θ(k)
Comm. Θ(1) O(k) Θ(k) Θ(1)
Prover Θ(k) O(k) Θ(k) Θ(k)
Verifier Θ(1) O(k) Θ(k) Θ(1)
RO yes yes yes no
ZK-sets yes yes
Committed subset yes
Set intersection yes yes yes
Set union yes yes
Set difference yes
Accumulator yes
4.5 Comparison with Previous Work
Our NIZK argument is as efficient as the zero-knowledge sets construction of Kate
et al. [63] in all parameters. Our NIZK set intersection argument is slightly less
efficient than Kissner-Song [65] in prover’s computation, and less efficient than
Jarecki-Liu [62] in CRS length, but is more efficient in both communication and
verifier’s computation. Hence, our NIZK argument for set operations is at least as
efficient as comparable constructions in the RO model. Moreover, we provide a
richer library of set operations, and can use our PMSET argument to construct set
membership, range argument, and accumulator. A more precise comparison can
be seen in Table 4.1.
We summarize our result in the following informal theorem.
Theorem 3. Our modular NIZK arguments for set relations are perfectly com-
plete and perfectly zero-knowledge. Under the PSDL assumption, PKE assump-
tion in G1, and PKE assumption in G2, they are adaptively computationally
sound. Moreover, we achieve efficiency comparable to prior NIZK arguments
for set relations in the RO model, and for a richer library of set relations.
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CHAPTER 5
NIZK ARGUMENT FOR SHUFFLE
5.1 Motivation
In traditional paper voting, a voter goes to a voting centre, where he takes a ballot
paper and votes in a ballot booth outside prying eyes. He then proceeds to seal the
ballot paper (either folds it or puts it in a prescribed envelope), which he finally
puts into a locked ballot box. When the voting period ends, the voting committee
will be able to unlock the ballot box and tally the votes publicly.
Figure 5.1: Traditional paper voting using a ballot box. To protect voters’ privacy, the box
must be shaken before unlocking the ballot box and tallying the votes.
The simple scenario above has an obvious weakness in terms of voter’s pri-
vacy. An observer who has seen the order of voters’ ballots going in and out of the
ballot box can get a very good guess on who voted for what. This can be reme-
died by having one or more people shaking the ballot box before it is unlocked for
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the tallying process. If at least one person does this diligently, then this process
will mostly remove the relationship between voters and their votes. However, it is
not clear how to check whether or not the process of shaking the ballot was done
diligently.
In electronic voting, we also want similar properties. A voter must be able
to send their votes to a vote collecting server and have the vote stay secret until
the tallying process, but the tallier (or anyone else, for that matter) must not be
able to infer what any voter voted for from the set of opened votes. In cryptog-
raphy, we know how to hide messages using public key encryption schemes that
are IND-CPA secure. However, if the decrypter receives the voter’s ciphertexts
directly from the voting server, the voters’ privacy is again breached by a curious
decrypter. Hence we also want to remove the association between voters and the
ciphertexts that reach the decrypter. This can be done by the use of mix-servers,
combined into a mix-network (or mix-net for short), which will individually per-
mute and re-randomize the ciphertexts, before sending it to the next mix-server
in the mix-net. (Another option is to have a decryption mix-net [27] where each
mix-server shuffles and decrypts one layer of the ciphertext.)
Figure 5.2: Electronic voting analogy. To protect voters’ privacy, the votes must be shuf-
fled before decrypting and tallying the votes.
To enable re-randomization of ciphertexts, we must use an encryption scheme
that is homomorphic, such as ElGamal. A bigger problem is how to prove that
each mix-server did its shuffle correctly, without revealing the permutation or ran-
domness values it used. The proof must be relatively short, transferable, and
verifiable at any time, even in a much later audit process when the mix-servers
have gone offline. Each mix-server thus has to provide a non-interactive zero-
knowledge shuffle argument.
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Assume that there are M mix-servers between the vote collecting server and
the decrypter. In some cases, the voting server is considered to be the the 0th (non-
mixing) mix-server, and the decrypter is considered the (M + 1)th mix-server.
To ensure security against malicious mix-servers, the kth mix-server checks the
shuffle argument of all the previous mix-servers, before creating its own shuffle
argument to send to the (k + 1)th mix-server. To get robustness, if the shuffle
argument of there first i mix-servers is valid, but the (i + 1)th is not, then the
(i + 1)th mix-server and all subsequent ones are ignored, and the kth mix-server
creates its shuffle argument using the output of the ith mix-server. This means
that the verifier’s computation is a bottleneck, especially for the mix-servers close
to the decrypter.
We note that before the final tallying, the decrypter would also need to prove
that it decrypts the final set of ciphertexts correctly. This decrypter is usually
implemented as a multi-party computation. However, we will omit this part in our
discussion.
5.2 Previous Work
There have been several results in interactive zero-knowledge shuffle arguments,
which can be made non-interactive in the RO model using the Fiat-Shamir heuris-
tic. Of these, Bayer and Groth [6] constructed the shuffle argument with most
efficient communication, and Furukawa [47] constructed the shuffle argument
with least number of rounds. The most computationally efficient interactive zero-
knowledge shuffle argument that we know of is by Groth [55]. It requires 7 rounds
of interaction, while still needing a CRS. In the CRS model (and without using
random oracles), there were two known NIZK shuffle arguments before our work,
namely by Groth and Lu [58], and Lipmaa and Zhang [71].
The Groth-Lu shuffle argument, constructed using Groth-Sahai proofs, is cul-
pably sound under one well-known and two newly defined computational assump-
tions. Culpable soundness in this case means that if an adversary can create an
accepting argument for an incorrect statement (i.e. the output set of ciphertexts is
not a shuffle of the input set of ciphertexts), then this adversary can work together
with a party that knows the secret key to break one of the stated computational
assumptions. However, these computational assumptions are defined in such a
way that knowledge of the secret key does not help in breaking them. Culpable
soundness is a weaker notion than adaptive soundness (where collaboration with a
party that knows the secret key is not necessary), but is still acceptable in the case
of electronic voting, since one can assume that some coalition of parties knows
the secret key. The Groth-Lu shuffle argument is significantly less efficient than
the Groth [55] RO model shuffle argument.
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The Lipmaa-Zhang shuffle argument is sound if there exists an extractor that
can access the adversary’s randomness values. Hence if an adversary can create an
accepting argument, by using the extractor it can be proven that the output set of
ciphertexts is indeed a shuffle of the input set of ciphertexts, except for a negligible
probability. We refer to this notion of soundness as white-box soundness [39],
which is a weaker notion than culpable soundness. Moreover, Lipmaa and Zhang
use the knowledge BBS cryptosystem (the standard BBS cryptosystem which they
modified to have a knowledge component) which is lifted (encrypts integers rather
than group elements), and to achieve soundness they additionally need to prove
that the plaintexts are small. The Lipmaa-Zhang shuffle argument is more efficient
than the Groth-Lu shuffle argument, but still significantly less efficient than the
RO-based Groth [55] shuffle argument.
5.3 Problem Statement
Is it possible to construct a NIZK shuffle argument in the CRS model that is much
closer in efficiency to the best NIZK shuffle arguments in the RO model?
5.4 Our First Solution
Let n be the number of ciphertexts, which we encrypt with regular (non-lifted)
ElGamal. We construct a NIZK shuffle argument by committing to an n × n
permutation matrix Ψ, and proving that it is used to permute the original set of
ciphertexts. We then extend this to work even if the permuted set of ciphertexts
is re-randomized. Similar to the Groth-Lu shuffle, we relax our security require-
ments, where instead of regular soundness we use culpable soundness. A full
description of our construction is given in the paper [39], which is a joint work
with Lipmaa.
5.4.1 Committing to a Matrix
We commit to matrix Mn×n by committing to each of the n rows separately.
Moreover, we commit to a row m = (m1, · · · ,mn) by using the (Pi(X))ni=0-
PolyCommit scheme of Section 2.11.1 with a knowledge component, using well-
chosen polynomials (Pi(X))ni=0 and knowledge secret γ, as follows:
Com(ck;m; r) = (g1, g
γ
2 )
rP0(χ)+
∑n
i=1miPi(χ) .
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5.4.2 Permutation Matrix Argument
The prover must prove that it commits to a permutation matrix. Due to Corol-
lary 2, it is sufficient to prove that the first n − 1 rows Ψi of Ψ (transposed) are
unit vectors, and that Ψn = 1n −
∑n
i=1 Ψi is also a unit vector. Hence we only
need to commit to the first n− 1 rows of the permutation matrix.
Due to Lemma 1, we can show that a is a unit vector iff ai ∈ {0, 1} for
i ∈ [1 .. n] (i.e., a is Boolean), and
n∑
i=1
ai = 1. Define V =
(
2·In×n
1Tn
)
, and
b =
(
0n
1
)
.
For a vector a ∈ Znp , we have that
V a+ b =

2a1
2a2
...
2an
n∑
i=1
ai

.
Hence (assuming n < p− 1) the n+ 1 conditions above hold iff
V a+ b ∈ {0, 2}n+1
⇐⇒ (V a+ b) ◦ (V a+ b− 2 · 1n+1) = 0n+1
⇐⇒ (V a+ b− 1n+1) ◦ (V a+ b− 1n+1) = 1n+1 .
Hence, a is a unit vector iff
(V a+ b− 1n+1) ◦ (V a+ b− 1n+1) = 1n+1 . (5.1)
We use the square span programs (SSP, [30]) approach that makes use of
Equation 5.1 to get a very efficient unit vector argument. To achieve this we
choose Pi(X) = yi(X) to be polynomials that interpolate the i-th column of V
for i ∈ [1 .. n], and y0(X) to be the polynomial that interpolates b− 1n+1.
5.4.3 Shuffle Argument
For a = (a1, a2) ∈ G21 and b ∈ G2, we define the double pairing Eˆ as Eˆ(a, b) =
(eˆ(a1, b), eˆ(a2, b)).
Let z be the set of original ElGamal ciphertexts, and let z′ be the set of shuf-
fled ciphertexts. Let pk = (g1, h) be the ElGamal public key. For i ∈ [1 .. n],
let zi = Encpk(mi;ui) = (g
ui
1 ,mi · hui) and z′i = zψ(i) · Encpk(mi; ti) =
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(g
uψ(i)+ti
1 ,mψ(i) · huψ(i)+ti). If the ciphertexts z′ were permuted but not re-
randomized (i.e. ti = 0 and z′i = zψ(i)), we could verify that z
′
i = zψ(i) simply by
checking that
n∏
i=1
Eˆ(z′i, g
γPi(χ)
2 ) =
n∏
i=1
Eˆ(zi, g
γPψ−1(i)(χ)
2 ) .
Note that if γ 6= 0, this holds iff the equation
n∑
i=1
Pi(χ)uψ(i) =
n∑
i=1
Pψ−1(i)(χ)ui
also holds.
However, just comparing z and z′ will clearly reveal the permutation ψ.
Moreover, to do this the verifier needs to know the values g
γPψ−1(i)(χ)
2 . Also,
as we will discuss below, it is not clear if this is sufficient to get soundness.
To ensure privacy, z′ needs to be both permuted and randomized (i.e. z′i =
zψ(i)·Encpk(1; ti) for some randomness value ti), and we need to replace g
Pψ−1(i)(χ)
2
with the value cγi2, where
(ci1, c
γ
i2) = (g1, g
γ
2 )
riP0(χ)+Pψ−1(i)(χ)
is a commitment of eψ−1(i), the ψ−1(i)-th unit vector. This makes the verification
equation become slightly more complicated. In particular, we need an extra error
term E such that the check becomes
n∏
i=1
Eˆ(z′i, g
γPi(χ)
2 ) =
n∏
i=1
Eˆ(zi, c
γ
i2) · E . (5.2)
Note that E depends on the CRS and the randomness values used in re-randomizing
the ciphertexts and committing the permutation matrix.
Same-message argument
Unfortunately, the verification equation Equation 5.2 is still not enough. This
is because an adversary can still make use of the CRS values and the fact that
Pi(X)Pj(X) = Pj(X)Pi(X) for all i, j ∈ [1 .. n] to create z′ which is not a
shuffle of z, but still satisfies Equation 5.2.
To fix this, we commit to the same permutation matrix, but with a different
(well-chosen) set of polynomials (Pˆi(X))ni=0. We then use the resulting commit-
ments (cˆi1, cˆ
γ
i2) to get a second verification equation
n∏
i=1
Eˆ(z′i, g
γPˆi(χ)
2 ) =
n∏
i=1
Eˆ(zi, cˆ
γ
i2) · Eˆ , (5.3)
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for some value Eˆ . However, we then need to prove that (ci1, cγi2) and (cˆi1, cˆγi2)
commit to the same vector. We call this a same-message argument. The idea of
committing the permutation matrix with a different set of polynomials was also
used by Groth and Lu [58], but in their case the construction is trivial, since they
used independent random variables (Xi)ni=0 instead of polynomials (Pi(X))
n
i=0,
and (Xi)ni=0 instead of (Pˆi(X))
n
i=0. Our same-message argument is more in-
volved, and is again constructed using square span programs.
PSP assumption
Recall that a prover must provide two sets of ciphertexts such that Equation 5.2
and Equation 5.3 hold, where (ci1, c
γ
i2)
n
i=1 and (cˆi1, cˆ
γ
i2)
n
i=1 are commitments to
the same permutation matrix, but using different commitment keys corresponding
to different sets of polynomials (Pi(X))ni=0 and (Pˆi(X))
n
i=0. We claim that a ma-
licious prover who sends a shuffle argument which is accepted by the verifier will
succeed with negligible probability. This claim is simplified into an assumption
that is easier to analyze, which we call the Power Simultaneous Product (PSP)
assumption.
Definition 15. Let (Pi(X))ni=0 and (Pˆi(X))ni=0 be tuples of polynomials. Let
d = max degPi(X). The ((Pi(X))ni=0, (Pˆi(X))
n
i=0)-PSP assumption states that
any NUPPT adversary A, given values ((g1, g2)χ
i
)di=0, ((g1, g2)
Pˆi(χ))ni=0) where
χ←r Zp, has negligible probability of producing values (s 6= 1n, t, tˆ) such that
tP0(χ) ·
n∏
i=1
s
Pi(χ)
i = tˆ
Pˆ0(χ) ·
n∏
i=1
s
Pˆi(χ)
i = 1 .
This assumption is related to the SP assumption of Groth and Lu [58], and can
be seen as a generalization of the matrix computational assumptions of Morillo,
Ràfols and Villar [74]. If we take a discrete log of the equations, the adversary
aims to output values (s′ 6= 0n, t′, tˆ′) such that the polynomials
S(X) = t′P0(X) +
n∑
i=1
Pi(X)
Sˆ(X) = t′Pˆ0(X) +
n∑
i=1
Pˆi(X)
satisfy S(χ) = Sˆ(χ) = 0. I We prove that if the polynomials (Pi(X))ni=0 and
(Pˆi(X))
n
i=0 are well chosen, the PSP assumption holds in the GBGM [39].
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Culpable soundness
We prove our shuffle argument is culpably sound with respect to the following
relation:
Rguiltsh,n =

(gk, (pk, (zi)
n
i=1, (z
′
i)
n
i=1), sk) :
gk ∈ BP(1κ, n) ∧ (pk, sk) ∈ genpkc(gk)∧
(∀ψ ∈ Sn : ∃i : Decsk(z′i) 6= Decsk(zψ(i)))
 .
Essentially, this means that if a malicious adversary cheats, then since he knows
the secret key, he knows the plaintexts he uses to cheat, and they are not shuffles
of each other.
Using the methods above, we get a perfectly complete, culpably sound, and
perfectly zero-knowledge shuffle argument under the XDH, PCDH, and TSDH
computational assumptions, the PKE knowledge assumption, and the PSP as-
sumption.
5.5 Our Second Solution
Again, let z be the set of original ciphertexts, and let z′ be the set of shuffled
ciphertexts. In the previous solution, we see that the verifier’s computation is
dominated by checking both Equation 5.2 and Equation 5.3 related to the two sets
of ciphertexts. This was necessary, since only checking one such solution did not
result in a sound shuffle argument, and additional verification steps were needed
to get soundness.
In our second solution, we construct a NIZK shuffle argument that improves
the previous construction by only needing one such verification equation. This
means that we no longer need to commit to the same permutation matrix twice,
and hence we no longer need the same-message argument. Instead, using the
technique used in the Lipmaa-Zhang shuffle argument, we require the ciphertext
to essentially be encrypted in both G1 and G2, and prove that they encrypt the
same message, which could only be computed from a specific small subset of
CRS values. This rules out the attack against only one verification equation of
the form Equation 5.2 that was possible in the first solution, and in fact results in
a sound shuffle argument. However, as will be evident in Section 5.5.3, in this
setting ElGamal is no longer IND-CPA secure, hence we encrypt the ciphertexts
using ILin instead.
We prove the soundness (and not culpable soundness) of the whole shuffle
argument in the GBGM. Essentially, we assume a single adversary that provides a
shuffle argument that is accepted by an honest verifier. In the GBGM, we require
that the adversary knows how he gets these values as a product or pairing of the
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CRS values. The CRS consists of values of type h = gH(χ)i , for known (multivari-
ate) polynomials H(X), where χ is a tuple of integers, each taken uniformly ran-
dom from Zp. Taking a discrete log, this means that verification equations such as
eˆ(A,B) = eˆ(g1, C) are equivalent to polynomial equations such as V (χ) = 0 for
V (X) = A(X)B(X)−C(X). By the Schwartz–Zippel lemma, this means that
the verification equations hold as a system of polynomial equations V (X) = 0.
However, if V (X) = 0, then every monomial of this polynomial has to have coef-
ficient zero, leading to a bigger system of polynomial equations. Using automated
tools such as Mathematica and wxMaxima, we then find the Gröbner basis for the
polynomial equations, and from solving this (also using automated tools) derive
soundness.
It can be argued that working in the GBGM is more reasonable than using
knowledge assumptions as in the Lipmaa-Zhang shuffle argument and our first
construction. Although soundness in the GBGM does not rule out existence of ad-
versarial attacks, it does imply that any possible attack is not generic and must use
the specific structure of the chosen bilinear group. In comparison, it is known that
knowledge assumptions do not hold if the auxiliary input is not well chosen [11],
and hence they must be very carefully formulated. Moreover, knowledge assump-
tions must at least be proven to hold in the GBGM, so it makes sense to just work
directly in the GBGM. As we have mentioned above, the use of GBGM enables
computerized analysis for many of the tedious parts of the soundness proof.
A full description of our construction is given in the paper [40], which is a
joint work with Lipmaa and Zaja˛c.
5.5.1 Committing to a Matrix
As in the first solution, commit to matrix Mn×n by committing to each of the n
rows separately. Similarly, we commit to a rowm = (m1, · · · ,mn) by using the
(Pi(X))
n
i=0-PolyCommit scheme of Section 2.11.1 using well-chosen polynomi-
als (Pi(X))ni=1 ∪ {%} as follows:
Com(ck;m; r) = (g1, g2)
r%(χ)+
∑n
i=1miPi(χ) .
Note that we do not need a knowledge value γ here. Moreover, the verifier
does not need to check the consistency of the first and second component of the
commitment. This makes the constructed arguments more efficient.
5.5.2 Permutation Matrix Argument
The prover must prove that it commits to a permutation matrix. Due to Corol-
lary 2, it is sufficient to prove that the first n − 1 rows Ψi of Ψ (transposed) are
1-sparse vectors, and that Ψn = 1n −
∑n
i=1 Ψi is also a 1-sparse vector. This
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method was also used in the Lipmang-Zhang shuffle argument [71]. Similar to the
first solution, we only need to commit to the first n − 1 rows of the permutation
matrix.
As in the first solution, we use SSP to prove that Equation 5.1 holds for a′ =
k · a, for some constant k. This will show that k · a is a unit vector, i.e., a is
1-sparse. Recall that Pi(X) are polynomials that interpolate the i-th column of V
for i ∈ [1 .. n], and P0(X) interpolates b− 1n+1 for i = 0.
Using techniques introduced in a recent work of Groth [57], this can be ver-
ified using only n pairing equations. We prove the resulting permutation matrix
argument is complete, witness-indistinguishable, and computationally sound in
the GBGM.
5.5.3 Shuffle Argument
For a = (a1, a2, a3) ∈ G31 and b ∈ G2, we define the triple pairing Eˆ as Eˆ(a, b) =
(eˆ(a1, b), eˆ(a2, b), eˆ(a2, b)).
Let z be the set of original ILin ciphertexts, and let z′ be the set of shuffled
ciphertexts. We recall the observation in the first solution that if z′ were permuted
but not re-randomized, we can verify that z′i = zψ(i) simply by checking that
n∏
i=1
Eˆ(z′i, g
Pi(χ)
2 ) =
n∏
i=1
Eˆ(zi, g
Pψ−1(i)(χ)
2 ) .
Moreover, to ensure privacy, z′ needs to again be be both permuted and random-
ized, and g
Pψ−1(i)(χ)
2 must be replaced by with ci2, where (ci1, ci2) is a commit-
ment of the unit vector eψ−1(i). Similar to our first solution, this introduces an ex-
tra term E to the verification equation, such that the check becomes Equation 5.2.
The main difference is that while E stays independent of the permutation and
randomness values used in the permutation matrix argument, it is of a slightly
different form compared to the term E used in our previous solution. We call the
resulting check a consistency argument.
Validity argument
As in the first solution, an adversary can still make use of the CRS values and
the fact that Pi(X)Pj(X) = Pj(X)Pi(X) to create z′ which is not a shuffle of
z, but still satisfies Equation 5.2. To fix this, we require the prover to shuffle the
ciphertext in both G1 and G2, and use a so-called validity argument to prove this
is done correctly. This restricts the form that Dec(z) and Dec(z′) can have, and in
the process rules out the mentioned adversarial attack.
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We use the same secret key sk in bothG1 andG2, with public key (g
%/β
1 , g
sk·%/β
1 )
forG1 and (g2, gsk2 ) forG2, for some random variables %, β. The use of the multi-
plier %/β in the public key for G1 is done so that the validity argument generates
additional equations in the GBGM proof. The obvious cost of this validity argu-
ment is the need to compute two sets of shuffled ciphertexts. Additionally, the
prover has to deal with ILin ciphertexts in G3i instead of ElGamal ciphertexts in
G21 as in the first solution. Consequently, in this part of the shuffle argument, the
prover needs to do slightly more computation than in the first solution.
Note that we cannot use ElGamal as in the first solution. First of all, we
would need to use lifted ElGamal to be able to encrypt the same message. Fur-
thermore, we no longer have IND-CPA security. This is, assume that we have
a public key (g%/β1 , h1 = g
sk·%·γ/β
1 ) for G1 and (g2, h2 = gsk2 ) for G2. (The
random variable γ takes into account all variations of this construction.) Let
z = (g
r·%/β
1 , g
m·%/β
1 h
r
1) ∈ G21 and z′ = (gr2, gm2 hr2) ∈ G22 be encryptions of the
same messagem inG1 andG2, respectively. Then we can easily check whether or
not m = 0, since it is equivalent to the pairing equation eˆ(z1, h2) = eˆ(g
%/β
1 , z
′
2).
The use of ILin in both G1 and G2 means that encryption is lifted, and thus
decryption is only efficient for small messages. However, due to the validity ar-
gument, the soundness proof in the GBGM takes into account adversaries that
encrypt potentially large messages. Hence, we do not need an additional range
proof as in [71] to get security of the shuffle argument.
Soundness
It turns out that adding the validity arguments is sufficient to get soundness. Us-
ing the methods above, we get a perfectly complete, computationally sound, and
perfectly zero-knowledge argument in the GBGM. Note that in the GBGM, we
do not get black-box soundness as in the first solution. However, compared to the
first solution, we achieve standard soundness instead of culpable soundness, and
do not use knowledge assumptions to extract an adversary’s input.
Batching
We further optimize the verifier’s computation by the use of batching, a technique
introduced by Bellare, Garay, and Rabin [8], that has not been used in previ-
ous CRS-based shuffle arguments. Essentially, instead of checking k verification
equations, the verifier generates k random values and uses them to replace this by
a single verification equation. The following lemma states that these two verifi-
cation checks are equivalent, except for a negligible probability. (See [39] for a
proof.)
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Lemma 4. Let (qi)i∈[1 .. k] be values chosen uniformly random from Zp. Let
(Fi(χ))i∈[1 .. k] be a tuple of multivariate polynomials Fi evaluated at some value
X = χ. If the equation
∏k
i=1 eˆ(g1, g2)
Fi(χ)qi = 1 holds for some values Fi(χ),
then with probability ≥ 1 − 1/p the k pairing equations eˆ(g1, g2)Fi(χ) = 1,
i ∈ [1 .. k] also hold.
This in itself does not improve the verifier’s computation time, and in fact
requires the verifier to do k extra exponentiations. However, under some circum-
stances, this enables us to replace pairings with exponentiations, which are less
costly. For example, if the k verification equations are of the form eˆ(Aig
Fi(χ)
1 , g2) =
1, where gFi(χ)1 can be computed from the CRS and the valuesAi are given by the
prover, then the verifier can simply check eˆ(
∏k
i=1(Aig
Fi(χ)
1 )
pi , g2) = 1, which re-
quires k exponentiations but only 1 pairing. Since exponentiation takes much less
time than pairings (in the performance result of [17] described below, a pairing
takes approximately the same time as 8 exponentiations in G1, or 4 exponentia-
tions in G2), this results in a significant improvement in verifier’s computation.
5.6 Comparison with Previous Work
Our first NIZK shuffle argument from Section 5.4 is more efficient than the Groth-
Lu and Lipmaa-Zhang shuffle arguments in all parameters except the CRS length.
By pre-computing values not related to the ciphertexts, the prover essentially only
needs to do two (n + 1)-wide multi-exponentiations in the online phase. As we
have seen above, we encrypt plaintexts using regular ElGamal, and prove that
our NIZK shuffle argument is culpably sound. However, we still need to use a
knowledge assumption (PKE) to achieve culpable soundness.
A more precise comparison between our first solution and previous work can
be seen in Table 5.1. Note that the CRS length and communication are given in
total group elements, the prover’s computation is given in total group exponentia-
tions, while the verifier’s computation is given in number of pairings. The best in
each parameter among the shuffle arguments in the CRS model are given in bold.
Our second NIZK shuffle argument from Section 5.5 is more efficient than our
first shuffle argument in all parameters except prover’s computation. Moreover,
we achieve computational soundness instead of culpable soundness. We prove
the soundness of the whole shuffle argument in the GBGM, and in the process
remove the need for separate computational and knowledge assumptions. Most
importantly, we get a much more efficient argument in terms of verifier’s compu-
tation, which we argued is the bottleneck of mix-nets.
A more precise comparison between our second solution and previous work
can be seen in Table 5.2. To have a better idea of running time, we write the
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Table 5.1: A comparison of our first NIZK shuffle argument [39] with the Groth-Lu [58]
and Lipmaa-Zhang [71] shuffle arguments in the CRS model, and Groth’s shuffle argu-
ment in the RO model [55]. The CRS length and communication are given in total group
elements, the prover’s computation is given in total group exponentiations, while the ver-
ifier’s computation is given in number of pairings.
Groth-Lu Lipmaa-Zhang Our first result Groth
|CRS| 2n + 8 7n+ 6 8n+ 17 n+ 1
Comm. 18n+ 120 12n+ 11 9n + 2 480n bits
Prover 54n+ 246 28n+ 11 18n + 3 8n
(2n+ 2 online)
Verifier 75n+ 282 28n+ 18 18n + 6 6n exp.
(8n+ 4 online)
Sound. culpable white-box culpably sound sound
PKE no yes yes no
efficiency values for each group separately. Note that we take n million clock
cycles as a basic work unit, using the performance results of Bos, Costello and
Naehrig [17] on a Core i7-3520M CPU, where an exponentiation in G1, an ex-
ponentiation in G2, an exponentiation in GT , and a pairing take respectively 0.9,
1.8, 3.1, and 7.0 million clock cycles.
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Table 5.2: A comparison of our second NIZK shuffle argument [40] with the Lipmaa-
Zhang [71] shuffle argument and our first NIZK shuffle argument [39]. The CRS length
and communication is given by a triple denoting the number of elements in (G1,G2,GT ).
The computation is given by the quadruple (e1, e2, eT , p), where ei is the number of
exponentiations in group Gi and p is the number of pairings, along with a weighted sum,
denoted by ≈ u, that approximates the number of work units required to compute it.
Lipmaa-Zhang Our first result Our second result
|CRS| (2n+ 2, 5n+ 4, 0) (6n+ 8, 2n+ 8, 1) (2n + 6,n + 7,1)
Comm. (8n+ 6, 4n+ 5, 0) (7n+ 2, 2n, 0) (4n + 1,3n + 2,0)
Prover (16n+ 6, 12n+ 5, (14n+ 3, 4n, 0, 0) (9n+ 2, 9n+ 3, 0, 0)
0, 0) ≈ 36 units ≈ 19.8 units ≈ 24.3 units
Verifier (0, 0, 0, 28n+ 18) (0, 0, 0, 18n+ 6) (11n+ 5, 3n+ 6, 1,
≈ 196 units ≈ 126 units 3n+ 6) ≈ 36.3 units
Sound. sound culpable sound
PKE yes yes no
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CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis we provide three scenarios where transferable non-interactive zero-
knowledge (NIZK) arguments are important. In the first scenario, we consider
verifiable computation and the need for easily checking that a solution to an NP-
complete problem is correct. In the second scenario, we look at the challenge of
authorization in real world situations, which involve proving some set relation,
and privacy requires us to hide one or more of the sets in the relation. In the third
scenario, we consider shuffling ciphertexts before decryption as a way to improve
privacy of electronic voting systems, by removing the relationship between voters
and their votes.
For these scenarios, we construct NIZK arguments in the common reference
string (CRS) model which are more efficient than existing work in the CRS model.
These NIZK arguments are arguably comparable in efficiency to the best known
NIZK arguments in the random oracle (RO) model.
In the first scenario, we get NIZK arguments for NP that are more efficient
than existing ones in the CRS model and use NP-complete languages that are
simpler to check than CIRCUIT-SAT, as described in the first publication. In the
second scenario, we get NIZK arguments for set operations that are as efficient
than existing ones in the RO model but for a bigger library of set operations, as
described in the second publication. In the third scenario, we get NIZK shuffle
arguments that are more efficient than existing ones in the CRS model, and are
almost as efficient as existing ones in the RO model, as described in the third and
fourth publications.
However, in all scenarios, there is still room for improvement. For example,
in the first three publications, the solutions involve the use of knowledge assump-
tions, in addition to computational assumptions, as shown in Table 5.3. These
knowledge assumptions are not very well studied, and introduce some efficiency
loss in the form of computing and verifying knowledge components in the result-
ing NIZK arguments. For example, in Section 3.4.1, a prover not only has to
compute a commitment to a vector a as C = grσ
υ+
∑n
i=1 aiσ
λi
1 , but also has to
provide a knowledge component C˜ = (gγ1 )
rσυ+
∑n
i=1 aiσ
λi , while the verifier has
to check that eˆ(C, gγ2 ) = eˆ(C˜, g2). How to improve the proposed solutions in
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general, and remove knowledge assumptions in particular, is an interesting topic
for future work.
Table 5.3: The hardness assumptions used in the published work introduced in this thesis.
Publication Computational
assumptions
Knowledge
assumptions
Fauzi, Lipmaa, and Zhang (2013) [41] PSDL PKE
Fauzi, Lipmaa, and Zhang (2014) [42] PSDL PKE
Fauzi and Lipmaa (2016) [39] XDH, TSDH,
PCDH, PSP
PKE
Fauzi, Lipmaa, and Zaja˛c (2016) [40] - -
There have been subsequent work that have in fact resulted in such improve-
ments. Lipmaa constructed a significantly improved permutation argument to get
a more efficient modular NIZK argument for NP than our first publication in [68]
and also constructed more efficient shift and product arguments in [69], while
Groth [57] constructed a non-modular NIZK argument for NP which is more ef-
ficient than existing work and is secure in the generic bilinear group model. Our
fourth publication improved the shuffle argument of our third publication and is
also secure in the generic bilinear group model. We are not aware of similar im-
provements over our second publication and our very recent fourth publication.
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KOKKUVÕTE
(SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN)
EFEKTIIVSED MITTEINTERAKTIIVSED
NULLTEADMUSPROTOKOLLID
REFERENTSSÕNE MUDELIS
Digitaalse ajastu võidukäiguga on interneti vahendusel võimalik sooritada aina
ulmelisemaid tegevusi. Täielikule krüpteeringule ehitatud mobiilsed rakendused,
nagu näiteks WhatsApp, suudavad tagada kõne või sõnumi jõudmise üksnes õi-
ge adressaadini. Enamik pangasüsteeme garanteerivad TLS protokolli kasutades,
et arvete maksmisel ja ülekannete sooritamisel ei oleks tehingute andmeid kel-
lelgi võimalik lugeda ega muuta. Mõned riigid pakuvad võimalust elektroonilisel
teel hääletada (näiteks Eesti) või referendumeid läbi viia (näiteks Šveits), tagades
sealjuures traditsioonilise paberhääletuse tasemel turvalisuse kriteeriumid. Kõik
eelnevalt kirjeldatud tegevused vajavad kasutajate turvalisuse tagamiseks krüp-
tograafilisi protokolle.
Tegelikkuses ei ole võimalik eeldada, et kõik protokolli osapooled järgivad
protokolli kirjeldust. Reaalses elus peab protokolli turvalisuseks iga osapool tões-
tama, et ta protokolli kirjeldust järgis. Paraku on osapoolel tihti ilma oma sisen-
di privaatsust ohverdamata seda väga raske teha. Üks viis selleks on kasutada
nullteadmusprotokolli. Nullteadmusprotokolliks nimetatakse tõestust, mis ei leki-
ta muud teavet peale selle, et väide on tõene. Lisades piirangu, et tõestaja töötab
polüomiaalse ajaga, saame nullteadusargumendi.
Tihti soovime, et nullteadmusargument oleks mitteinteraktiivne ja edasikan-
tav. Sellisel juhul piisab, kui tõestus on arvutatud ainult ühe korra ning verifitseeri-
jatel on võimalik seda igal ajal kontrollida. Interaktiivset nullteadmusprotokolli on
võimalik muuta mitteinteraktiivseks kasutades (näiteks) Fiat-Shamiri heuristikat,
kus verifitseerija sõnumid tõestajale on asendatud juhuslike sõnumitega samast
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hulgast. Saadud protokoll on turvaline juhusliku oraakli mudelis.
Teine viis mitteinteraktiivsuse saavutamiseks on kasutada referentssõne mu-
delit (inglise keeles reference string model), kus usaldusväärne kolmas osapool
väljastab ühise sõne, mis sisaldab ausa verifitseerija vastust interaktiivses proto-
kollis. Käesolevas töös pakume välja kolm stsenaariumit, kus mitteinteraktiivne
nullteadmusargument referentssõne mudelis on efektiivsuselt võrreldav parimate
teadaolevate mitteinteraktiivsete argumentidega juhusliku oraakli mudelis.
Esimeses stsenaariumis vaatleme verifitseeritavat arvutamist ning seda, kui-
das lihtsalt kontrollida NP-täielike ülesannete lahendusi. Selleks koostame kaks
põhilist mitteinteraktiivset argumenti referentssõne mudelis ja näitame, et nen-
de abil on võimalik koostada mitteinteraktiivne argument mistahes NP keele
jaoks, sealhulgas efektiivne intervallargument. Saadud mitteinteraktiivsed null-
teadmusargumendid NP keelte jaoks ja intervallargumendid on efektiivsemad
kui varasemad tulemused referentssõne mudelis ning kergemini kontrollitavad kui
CIRCUIT-SAT.
Teises stsenaariumis uurime autoriseerimise väljakutset reaalses elus. Tasub
tähele panna, et mitmed sellised situatsioonid sisaldavad tõestust mingile hulka-
devahelisele seosele ja privaatsus vajab ühe või mitme hulga peitmist relatsioonis.
Konstrueerime uue mitteinteraktiivse nullteadmusargumendi, et tõestada lihtne re-
latsioon PMSET nelja kinnitatud multihulga vahel ja näitame, kuidas neid ka-
sutada hulga sisalduvuse ja intervall- ning teiste argumentide konstrueerimiseks.
Sellest tuletatud mitteinteraktiivsed nullteadmusargumendid hulga tehete jaoks on
sama efektiivsed kui varasemad tulemused juhusliku oraakli mudelis, kuid suure-
ma tehete hulgaga.
Kolmandas stsenaariumis vaatleme krüptogrammide segamist enne dekrüp-
teerimist kui viisi privaatsuse tõstmiseks elektroonilise hääletuse süsteemides,
peites ära seose hääletaja ja tema hääle vahel. Konstrueerime kaks efektiivset
segamisargumenti referentssõne mudelis, mis on efektiivsuselt peaaegu võrdsed
varasemate tulemustega juhusliku oraakli mudelis.
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